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INTRODUCTION
Death and taxes, Benjamin Franklin once said, are the two certainties of
life.1 In the federal estate tax, these two certainties coalesce. The coalescence
in not complete, however, because not all property in which a decedent has an
interest is subject to the tax.
Although sound estate tax policy requires that certain items be exempt
from estate taxation,2 not all estate tax exemptions implement sound tax pol-
icy. Some items are exempt in furtherance of non-tax policy objectives.3 Thus,
until 1982, the federal estate tax generally exempted the proceeds of qualified
pension, profit sharing and stock bonus plans ("qualified plans") from taxa-
tion." This exemption was consistent with the preferential status accorded such
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to M. Leroy (1789), reprinted in J. BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 423 (14th ed. 1968). Mr. Franklin was expressing his uncer-
tainty about the longevity of the Constitution. The sentence in its entirety is as follows:
"Our Constitution is in actual operation; everything appears to promise that it will last;
but in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes." Id.
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2054 (1986), which provide deductions for, and
therefore exempt from estate taxation, amounts used to satisfy expenses of administra-
tion, claims against the estate and property which has been destroyed.
3. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2055 (1986), which provides a deduction for charitable
contributions.
4. Qualified plans are deferred compensation plans which meet the requirements
of I.R.C. § 401(a). Section 401(a) describes the requirements that a trust which con-
tains the assets of such a plan must meet in order to constitute a "qualified trust."
I.R.C. § 401(a) (1986). A qualified trust established by an employer provides substan-
tial income tax advantages to both the employee participants in the plan and the spon-
sor employer. Thus, although amounts contributed to the trust are shielded from the
claims of the employer's creditors and are irrevocably set aside for the benefit of the
employee participants, the employees do not recognize income as a result of the contri-
butions until they receive them. I.R.C. § 402(a) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-
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plans under the income tax laws,5 and was intended to further the non-tax
objective of encouraging the formation and maintenance of private retirement
plans.6 Nevertheless, in 1982, Congress reduced the exemption to $100,000.1
In 1984 it eliminated the exemption completely8 by repealing section 2039(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
The result of repealing the qualified plan exemption is that the value of
any annuity or other payment which a survivor beneficiary receives from a
qualified plan10 is in included in a decedent's gross estate, and is thus sub-
jected to federal estate taxation. Although it implemented sound estate tax
policy," the repeal of the qualified plan exemption could also have broad, and
almost certainly unforeseen, consequences. It could allow the Internal Revenue
Service (the "Service") to aggregate benefits provided under qualified plans
with benefits provided under non-qualified plans1 2 and thus conclude that sur-
l(a)(1)(i) (1986). In addition, the employer may deduct the contributions when made.
I.R.C. § 404(a)(1) (1986). Any income generated by the amounts contributed to the
trust is not subject to federal income tax until distributed to the employees because the
trust is a tax exempt entity. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986). See infra note 45 and accompany-
ing text.
5. See supra note 4.
6. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4067, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4017; see also Commerce Union Bank v. United States, 76-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 13,157, at 85,705-07 (M.D. Tenn. 1976).
7. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 245(b), 96 Stat. 524 (1982).
8. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 525(a), 98 Stat. 873 (1984) [hereinafter the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, "DEFRA"], repealed the qualified plan exemption. DEFRA
substituted a new section 2039(c) which exempted a spouse's interest in a qualified
pension or profit sharing plan from estate taxation in that spouse's gross estate when
the interest arose by reason of the community property laws of a state. I.R.C. §
2039(c) (1986). Section 1852(e)(i) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), [hereinafter "TRA 1986"] repealed this provision in its
entirety, effective for decedents dying after the date of enactment, October 22, 1986.
9. Unless otherwise stated all section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986. References to prior versions of a section will be indicated by a parenthet-
ical reference to the year during which the prior version in question was in effect.
10. The repeal of § 2039(c) actually resulted in the inclusion in a decedent's
gross estate of other survivor benefits in addition to benefits payable under qualified
pension or profit sharing plans because § 2039(c) had also excluded benefits payable
under § 403(a) plans and benefits payable by § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) or (vi) charitable
organizations or by religious organizations that were exempt from tax under § 501(a)
as well as military benefits payable under Chapter 73 of Title 10 of the United States
Code (10 U.S.C. § 1431 (1982)). See infra notes 58-60.
11. Sound estate tax policy requires that all wealth which passes at death be
subject to the tax. Section 2039(c) exempted certain qualified plan proceeds from taxa-
tion even though those proceeds represented wealth that passed at death. The exemp-
tion was based on the source of the wealth. Sound estate tax policy requires that the
transfer of wealth, not its source, determine the incidence of taxation. See infra note
49.
12. Non-qualified plans are deferred compensation plans which do not meet the
requirements of § 401(a). To succeed in deferring income taxation of the amounts con-
tributed to any such plan on behalf of an employee, the plan must be structured so as
3
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vivor benefits provided under both types of plans should be included in a dece-
dent's gross estate. The Service could reach this result by applying an aggre-
gation rule sanctioned by the Regulations 13 and the courts.14 The Service
could therefore use the repeal of the qualified plan exemption as a means to
subject to federal estate taxation many non-qualified survivor benefits" which
it has found difficult to subject to such taxation in the past. 6
This Article examines the appropriate scope of the aggregation rule and
formulates a test for determining its application. Because it is impossible to
understand the aggregation rule without understanding section 2039, the Arti-
cle begins by analyzing that section in Part I. It then sets forth the genesis and
scope of the aggregation rule in Part II and discusses its application in Part
III. Having analyzed the current state of the law, the Article then develops a
two-pronged test for determining whether particular employee benefits should
be aggregated for purposes of section 2039. Part IV of the Article describes
that test.
Application of the test reveals that qualified and non-qualified plans
should not be aggregated for purposes of section 2039 because qualified plans
are subject to such strict statutory constraints that they simply do not provide
an opportunity for the abuse which the aggregation rule was designed to pre-
vent. Part V therefore suggests that the Treasury's regulations and the Ser-
vice's rulings should be revised and expanded to reflect a more analytically
sound expression of the aggregation rule. Such action will clarify the law and
prevent the Service from using the repeal of the qualified plan exemption to
tax survivor benefits provided under non-qualified plans. It will ensure that
estate taxation proceeds from a deliberate decision grounded in sound estate
tax policy, not from inadvertence.
I. THE STATUTE
Faced with a case involving section 2039(c), Judge Raum of the Tax
to avoid the application of normal principles of federal income taxation. See infra note
214. Thus, although non-qualified plans are spared the rigors of compliance with §
401(a), they are denied the benefits provided by §§ 402(a), 404(a)(1) and 501(a). See
supra note 4.
13. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) (1986).
14. Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962); see infra note
132.
15. Non-qualified survivor benefits are benefits payable to an employee's survi-
vors under a non-qualified plan.
16. The Service is apparently so determined to subject death benefits provided
under non-qualified plans to transfer taxation that it has even taken the position that
an employee makes a taxable gift by continuing to perform services for an employer
which will provide death benefits to his survivors. Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 653 (1986). Although the Tax Court easily rebuffed this attempt, the Service's
persistence suggests that it will use whatever tools are at its disposal to subject such
benefits to tax. In the aggregation rule, the Service might find the perfect tool for that
purpose. See infra note 94.
[Vol. 53
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Court wrote that he shared in the taxpayer's "indignation ... about the com-
plexity of the statutory provisions involved,' ' 7 and noted that "[i]t is virtually
mindboggling to thread one's way through this maze."'18 Because Judge
Raum's reaction to section 2039 is far from unique and because an under-
standing of the statute is essential to an understanding of the issue addressed
in this Article, it will be useful to begin by understanding how the statute
became so imponderable.
A. Estate Taxation of Annuities Generally
Section 2039(a) includes in a decedent's gross estate and thus subjects to
federal estate taxation the value of any annuity or other payment which a
decedent's survivors may receive.' 9 Amounts payable to a survivor are taxable
under section 2039 if they meet three requirements. First, the amounts must
constitute an annuity or other payment - the post-death payment require-
ment.20 Second, the payments must result from a contract or agreement - the
contract requirement. 2' Third, the decedent must have had a right to receive
the payments during his or her life - the lifetime payment requirement. 2
When Congress enacted section 2039 in 1954, it intended to subject the
value of the survivor benefits payable under the typical joint and survivor an-
nuity to federal estate taxation. 3 Such survivor benefits represent wealth
17. Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 980, 984 (1986).
18. Id. at 987.
19. Section 2039 provides as follows:
SEC. 2039 ANNUITIES.
(a)GENERAL. - The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the dece-
dent under any form of contract or agreement entered into after March 3,
1931 (other than as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent), if,
under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable
to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or
payment, either alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any
period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death.
(b)AMOUNT INCLUDIBLE. - Subsection (a) shall apply to only such
part of the value of the annuity or other payment receivable under such con-
tract or agreement as is proportionate to that part of the purchase price there-
for contributed by the decedent. For purposes of this section, any contribution
by the decedent's employer or former employer to the purchase price of such
contract or agreement (whether or not to an employee's trust or fund forming
part of a pension, annuity, retirement, bonus or profit sharing plan) shall be
considered to be contributed by the decedent if made by reason of his
employment.
I.R.C. § 2039(a), (b) (1986).
20. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1986).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91, A314-16 (1954), reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4117; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
1988]
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which the decedent accumulated but which passes to the survivor upon the
decedent's death.24 Such wealth should be subject to estate taxation as if it
had been a part of the decedent's probate estate.25 Section 2039(a) ensures
that it will be.
The three requirements of section 2039(a) are tailored to reflect the char-
acteristics of the typical joint and survivor annuity.26 Such an annuity would
most commonly be evidenced by a contract, hence the contract requirement.
The contract would typically provide that the individual would receive pay-
ments of a specific amount for his or her life, hence the lifetime payment re-
quirement. The contract would also provide that at the individual's death, the
payments would either continue for the life of a named survivor or be payable
Sess. 123-24, 469-72 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4756-57; H.R. REP. No. 2543 (Conference Report), 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5335-36; see Bittker, Estate and
Gift Taxation Under the 1954 Code: The Principal Changes, 29 TUL. L. REv. 453, 469(1955); Colliton, Conforming Section 2039 to the Goals of Estate Tax, 34 U. FLA. L.
REv. 693, 695-96 (1982).
24. By purchasing a joint and survivor annuity, rather than a single life annuity,
the decedent in effect transfers funds to the holder of the annuity in return for such
holder's promise to pay a certain amount to a survivor. Economics prove that this is so.
Thus, a joint and survivor annuity typically costs more than a single life annuity. For
example, if the primary annuitant is 45 years old at the time of purchase, each $100 of
monthly benefit for a single-life annuity with benefits which begin at age 60, would cost
$154.98. The same benefit under a joint and survivor contract, assuming both parties
are the same age at the time of purchase, would cost $163.74. (Figures derived from
telephone conversation with a representative of a national insurer on June 23, 1987;
information on file with author). The additional amount paid for the survivor annuity,
plus earnings thereon, represents wealth accumulated by the decedent and transferred
to the survivor.
25. All property in which a decedent had an interest at the time of death is
included in his or her gross estate. I.R.C. § 2033 (1986). Property which forms a part
of the probate estate will almost certainly meet that requirement. Indeed, in 1926 Con-
gress found it necessary to broaden the language of the predecessor of § 2033 to ensure
that property which passed outside the probate estate would nevertheless form part of
the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub.
L. No. 20, § 302(a), 44 Stat. 70 (1926).
26. Joint and survivor annuities take many different forms, as the insurance in-
dustry responds to the needs of the market and the public. Because the terms of the
annuity are a matter of contract between the insurer and the holder of the policy, the
specific terms of the policies can vary greatly. The terms of the joint and survivor
annuity described here reflect the essential elements of the joint and survivor annuity:
payments to a primary beneficiary for life with payments continuing for the life of a
survivor. This is the model that Congress had before it when it enacted § 2039. See S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 469-70 (1954). The variations which the insurance
industry has developed, such as joint and survivor annuities for a term certain, share
this basic characteristic. See supra note 24. Therefore, this Article will refer to annui-
ties which provide for payments for the life of a primary beneficiary and a survivor as
typical joint and survivor annuities. For a brief discussion of various forms and types of
commercial annuities and alternatives to such annuities, see Lefrak, When to Use Pri-
vate Annuities, N.Y.U. FORTIETH ANNUAL INST. ON FED. TAX'N 2-1 (1982).
[Vol. 53
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to the survivor in a lump sum, hence the post-death payment requirement.
B. Taxation of Survivor Annuities Prior to the 1954 Code
Neither the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 nor any of its predecessors
contained any provision that specifically included the value of survivor benefits
payable under a joint and survivor annuity in the gross estate.27 The Service
therefore had to use the more general provisions of the Code to tax such annu-
ities. 28 Although the Service usually succeeded in doing so, its theories varied
from case to case.29 The cases do not reveal whether the Service also at-
tempted to reach survivor's annuities paid by what were then called "em-
ployee's trusts," the forerunners of today's qualified plans, but no published
announcement of an exemption for such annuities exists.30
The general confusion over the scope of the more general provisions of the
estate tax and the courts' unwillingness to extend the reach of those provisions
during this period led to much uncertainty. 1 In the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 Congress attempted to resolve that uncertainty by adding section 2039.2
27. See Joseph, The Estate Tax Impact on Survivor Annuities; How Far Can
Section 2039 Reach?, 25 J. TAX'N 214 (1966); Murphy, Federal Tax Treatment of
Annuities, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 311, 320 (1955). It has even been noted that annuities
"had no real home in the gross estate provisions which could be called their own" until
1954. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL ESTATE & GiFr TAXATION 399 (1958).
28. In some cases the value of the survivor annuity was included under the pred-
ecessor of section 2036. Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.
1942); Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821
(1942). In others, it was included as a transfer which was intended to take effect at
death under the predecessor of section 2038.
29. See supra note 28.
30. Employee's trusts are trusts which would qualify under § 401(a).
31. The development of some of the more specialized estate tax provisions, such
as §§ 2036 (transfers with retained life estates), 2037 (transfers taking effect at death),
2038 (revocable transfers), 2041 (powers of appointment) and even 2042 (life insur-
ance), shows that historically the courts have been reluctant to extend the reach of §
2033, the "catch all" estate tax provision, to items which might not literally and tech-
nically fall within its terms. Taxpayers' success in avoiding the estate tax through art-
ful structuring of their affairs caused Congress to respond by enacting specific provi-
sions designed to curb specific types of perceived abuses. For a discussion of the
taxpayer action - government reaction pattern that resulted in the evolution of some
of the foregoing provisions, see Bittker, The Church and Spiegel Cases: Section 811(c)
Gets a New Lease on Life, 58 YALE L.J. 825 (1949); Bittker, Church and Spiegel: The
Legislative Sequel, 59 YALE L.J. 395 (1950); Eisenstien, The Hallock Problem: A
Case Study in Administration, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1945); Spencer, The Federal
Estate Tax on Inter Vivos Trusts: A Common Sense Rule for Hallock Cases, 59
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1945); Surrey & Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal
Estate Tax, 32 CoLUM. L. REV. 1332 (1932).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91, A314-16, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4019, 4117, 4457-59; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
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C. Section 2039, The Statutory Model
1. Policy Considerations
The addition of section 2039 resolved the uncertainty over the inclusion of
a joint and survivor annuity in a decedent's gross estate. This uncertainty had
been particularly troublesome because of the disparity it created in the treat-
ment of unconsumed single life annuities and joint and survivor annuities.33
33. I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033 (1986); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1, 20.2033-1 (1986);
see Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 465 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1972);
Greene v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 459 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Estate of Gamble v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 942 (1978). The need to have estate tax parity between the uncon-
sumed single life annuity and the joint and survivor annuity exists regardless of
whether the decedent purchases the annuity of his or her own accord or receives it as a
benefit from his employer. If an individual receives a single life annuity from an em-
ployer, the only portion of the payments which would be included in his or her gross
estate would be the portion which the individual had received but not consumed during
life. The single life annuity is then like the individual's salary. It is part of the compen-
sation received from the employer for services rendered; it ceases at death and, like
salary, it should be subject to the federal estate tax only to the extent that it is not
consumed during life. If, instead of a single life annuity, an individual's employer uses
the same amount to purchase a joint and survivor annuity which provides for lower
payments during the employee's life but which provides that payments continue for the
life of a designated survivor, the result should not differ. As in the case of the single life
annuity, the joint and survivor annuity is like an individual's salary. It is part of the
compensation for services rendered. Like the unconsumed portion of the single life an-
nuity, the survivor portion of the employer provided joint and survivor annuity is also
compensation to the employee for services rendered. Since, by hypothesis, the survivor
portion was not consumed during the employee's life but passes to the survivor, it
should be subject to the estate tax in the same way that unconsumed salary would have
been. Section 2039 was designed to ensure that it will be.
To illustrate, if A's employer provided her with an annuity of $1000 per week for
life and A actually received the annuity for 10 years (a total of $520,000), the only
portion of those payments that would be included in A's gross estate would be the
portion, if any, that A had not consumed as of the time of her death. If only $104,000,
or 20 percent, of the total remained in A's bank account at her death and was be-
queathed to her husband, then only $104,000 of the total would be included in A's
gross estate under § 2033.
If instead of giving her a $1000 per week single life annuity, A's employer had
given her a joint and survivor annuity pursuant to which she would only receive $800
per week during her life but her husband would begin to receive payments of $500 per
week at her death, the present value of which was $104,000 at the time of her death,
the federal estate tax consequences should not differ. Nevertheless, § 2033 might have
allowed the $104,000 value of the husband's annuity in the second case to escape estate
taxation. See supra note 31. In both the unconsumed single life and the joint and survi-
vor annuity cases the $104,000 which A in effect earned during her life passed to her
husband and should be included in A's gross estate.
To the extent that the joint and survivor annuity was provided by A's employer, its
cost represents compensation for services rendered. If A's employer spends $1000 to
purchase an annuity for A, that $1000 is compensation to her in the same way as if A's
employer had paid A $1000 which A then used to purchase an annuity for herself. For
federal income tax purposes the $1000 would be income in either case unless the annu-
8
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An individual who had single life annuity but did not consume all of the
amounts received would face certain inclusion of those amounts in his or her
gross estate.' By contrast, an individual who used those otherwise uncon-
sumed amounts to purchase a survivor annuity (or who initially purchased a
joint and survivor annuity rather than a single life annuity) might be able to
avoid estate taxation of the survivor benefits.
3 5
2. Statutory Requirements and Judicial Construction
Although Congress could have chosen to tax only the prototypical joint
and survivor annuity under section 2039, it did not do so.8 6 Instead, Congress
chose to cast its net widely to include in a decedent's gross estate the value of
any
annuity or other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving
the decedent under any form of contract or agreement ... if, under such
contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable to the dece-
dent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment
either alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death."37
ity was purchased through the employer's contribution to a qualified plan. See I.R.C. §
403(c) (1986).
34. See supra note 33.
35. The potential disparity existed regardless of whether the individual pur-
chased the annuity with his or her own capital or received it as an additional benefit
from his or her employer.
36. It is possible to craft a statutory provision that defines a joint and survivor
annuity narrowly. In the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat.
1426 (1984) [hereinafter "REACT"], Congress did just that. REACT amended sec-
tion 401(a)(11) to require that qualified plans provide retirement benefits in the form
of a "qualified joint and survivor annuity" unless the plan participant and his or her
spouse waived their right to such an annuity. I.R.C.. §§ 401(a)(1 1), 417 (1986). RE-
ACT also added § 417 to the Code. Section 417(b) defines the term "qualified joint
and survivor annuity" as an annuity:
(1) for the life of the participant [in the qualified plan] with a survivor annu-
ity for the life of the spouse which is not less than 50 percent of (and is not
greater than 100 percent of) the amount of the annuity which is payable dur-
ing the joint lives of the participant and the spouse, and (2) which is the
actuarial equivalent of a single annuity for the life of the participant.
I.R.C. § 417(b) (1986). Such term also includes any annuity having the effect of an
annuity described in the preceding sentence. The § 417(b) definition is not materially
different from the definitions contained in § 401 (a)(ll)(G)(iii) prior to REACT. A
definition like the § 417(b) definition could have been used in § 2039 if Congress had
chosen to include only the value of survivor's benefits under the prototypical joint and
survivor annuity in a decedent's gross estate. Congress would only have needed to elim-
inate the 50 percent requirement of § 417(b)(1). While such a requirement is desirable
in a provision like § 417(b), which in effect sets forth the minimum benefit that a
qualified plan must provide, its inclusion in a provision like § 2039 would make avoid-
ance too simple.
37. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1986). For a comprehensive analysis of § 2039, see
9
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Although the requirements of section 2039(a) reflect the structure of the
typical joint and survivor annuity, the courts have not limited application of
the provision to such annuities. For example, the words "or other payment",
which Congress probably inserted after the work "annuity" solely to prevent
avoidance by creative taxpayers,3 have served to broaden the reach of the
provision. Courts and the Service have treated any death benefit payment
made to a survivor as an "other payment," even if the payment was made in a
lump sum without regard to life expectancy and thus bore little resemblance to
payments under the prototypical joint and survivor annuity. 9 Under this ap-
proach even pure death benefits easily fulfill the post-death payment
requirement.40
Pure death benefits also fulfill the contract requirement. Although the
statute requires that the annuity or other payment be payable under a "con-
tract or agreement," the Service and the courts have had little trouble finding
that a contract or agreement existed between an employer and employee.41 In
Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 DUKE L.J. 341;
Note, Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 66 YALE L.J. 1217 (1957).
38. If § 2039 applied only to annuities but not to "other payments," an individ-
ual could avoid the provision by receiving a lump sum instead of an annuity. Alterna-
tively, in the absence of a statutory definition of the term "annuity," an individual
could arrange for a series of payments which do not depend on life expectancy and
might arguably not constitute an annuity. Since such an arrangement would have the
same effect as an annuity insofar as it would represent a transfer of wealth from the
living to the dead, it should also be subject to the federal estate tax. The addition of the
words "or other payment" in § 2039 ensure that it will be.
39. See, e.g., Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
40. Throughout this Article, the term "pure death benefit" will be used to refer
to death benefits provided under plans which do not provide for any payments whatso-
ever except upon an individual's death. The term was coined by Dean Wolk in Wolk,
The Pure Death Benefit: An Estate and Gift Tax Anomaly, 66 MINN. L, RaV. 229
(1982), an excellent article urging inclusion of such benefits in the gross estate. See
infra note 44.
41. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) defines the term "contract or agreement" to
include "any arrangement, understanding or plan, or any combination of arrangements,
understandings or plans arising by reason of the decedent's employment." Although the
regulations appear to require that the employee have the right to enforce the terms of a
plan unilaterally adopted by the employer, they also appear to conclude that under
some circumstances the employer's past practice will suffice. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-
1(b)(2), example 4 (1986). In example 4 the Treasury posits a situation where the
employers' plan provided for payments to the employee and a designated beneficiary if
the employee retired at age 60. If the employee died before retiring at age 60 and the
employer nevertheless paid an annuity to his survivor, the example concludes that no
contract or agreement existed because the employee possessed no enforceable right to
receive benefits. The Treasury notes, however, that if it could be established that the
employer had "consistently paid an annuity under such circumstances, the annuity will
be considered as having been paid under a 'contract or agreement.'" Treas. Reg. §
20.2039-1(b)(2), example 4 (1986). Although the courts have not always interpreted
this last provision as broadly as the Service might like (see, e.g., Estate of Barr v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963), acq. in result, 1964-1 C.B. 4; Courtney v. United
States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d 6492, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 13,580 (N.D. Ohio 1984)),
10
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some cases, the employment relationship itself has sufficed to fulfill this re-
quirement.4 2 The courts find the contract requirement unmet only where the
employer makes a payment which neither a written agreement nor the em-
ployer's prior practice gives the beneficiary any right to expect.43
its very existence allows the Service to try to sweep into the gross estate under § 2039
death benefits paid pursuant to the employer's custom or practice even when the em-
ployer has no contractual obligation to make them.
Where the employee had enforceable rights the courts have had little trouble find-
ing a contract or agreement. Thus, the Tax Court has concluded that the need for a
committee to determine whether a qualified beneficiary existed did not prevent the plan
which so required from constituting a contract or agreement for purposes of § 2039.
Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269 (1966). In Gray v. United States, 410
F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1969), the value of benefits payable under a survivorship plan was
included in the employee's gross estate even though the estate had argued that there
was no contract or agreement between the employer and the beneficiary. The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether § 2039 created a federal contract relation-
ship because it found that the beneficiary could enforce the contract as a third party
beneficiary under contract principles defined by reference to state law. Id. at 1106.
In some cases courts have found the contract requirement satisfied even though no
contract existed. In Neely v. United States, 613 F.2d 802 (Ct. Cl. 1980), the court held
that a contract or agreement existed for purposes of § 2039 because the board of direc-
tors of the decedent's employer, a corporation in which the decedent owned 50 percent
of the stock, had voted to award him a pension which would provide survivor benefits to
his widow. The court was not persuaded by the estate's argument that no enforceable
contract existed. Id. at 808. It concluded that holding otherwise would allow closely
held corporations to avoid § 2039. Id.
The tax court and one district court have placed the only existing constraint upon
the definition of the term "contract or agreement" for purposes of § 2039. In Estate of
Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963), acq. in result, 1964-1 C.B. 4, the court
refused to find a contract or agreement where the employer had a plan under which it
had the option of paying an amount to an employee's survivors. The court found that
the employer's practice of making such a payment did not suffice to make the plan an
enforceable contract or agreement. Id. at 235-36. The court distinguished the situation
posed in Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2), example 4, supra, because in Barr, it had
found no enforceable agreement at all. Barr, 40 T.C. at 235-36. In Courtney v. United
States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d 6492, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 13,580 (N.D. Ohio 1984),
the court reached a similar conclusion.
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1)(ii) (1986), quoted supra, note 41, is certainly
broad enough to allow such a reading. See, e.g., Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305
F.2d 827, 831-32 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The Bahen court concluded that "[a] compensation
plan unilaterally adopted by the employer, but made irrevocable and communicated to
the employee, falls directly within [the definition of contract or agreement], at least
where the employee continues in the company's service after adoption of the plan." Id.
at 830.
43. See, e.g., Courtney v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d 6492, 84-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) § 13,580 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (company's promise to pay beneficiary's annu-
ity made in recognition of decedent's past services was not in substance or fact an
enforceable contract; widow had no power to compel payment, nor had company con-
sistently paid annuities under the plan in the past); Estate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40
T.C. 227 (1963) (although employer consistently paid annuity benefits to beneficiaries,
even where employees did not live long enough to qualify for those benefits, the court
found no enforceable contract or agreement). But see Neely v. United States, 613 F.2d
19881
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The courts' willingness to construe both the payment and the contract
requirements so broadly would have made section 2039 applicable to all pure
death benefits if not for the lifetime payment requirement also contained in
section 2039(a). 44 This requirement should have ensured that section 2039
would apply only to arrangements that had the salient characteristic of a joint
and survivor annuity: payments that are made during the life of one individual
continue to be made to another individual after the first individual's death. A
lump sum payment made by an employer to an employee's survivors under an
agreement which did not give the employee any right to lifetime payments
does not possess this characteristic, and therefore should not be included in the
employee's gross estate under section 2039.41
Nevertheless, the Service's use of the aggregation rule to satisfy the life-
time payment requirement and the courts' unwillingness to place significant
bounds on that use have caused pure death benefits to be included in the gross
estates of employees.' 8 This has resulted in the need to examine the extent to
which the repeal of the qualified plan exclusion will give rise to new attempts
to include pure death benefits in a decedent's gross estate under section 2039.
802 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (because the surviving beneficiary held a controlling interest in the
company the court found an agreement to pay annuity benefits under an "arrangement,
understanding or plan" as contemplated by Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-I(b)(1)(ii)). See
also supra note 41.
44. Some commentators have suggested that pure death benefits should be in-
cluded in the gross estate. See Wolk, supra note 40, at 230 (concluding that § 2038
can be applied to include pure death benefits in the gross estate despite the courts'
reluctance to do so; also suggesting gift taxation of such benefits as an alternative to
estate taxation); and Colliton, Conforming Section 2039 to the Goals of Estate Tax,
34 U. FLA. L. REV. 693 (1982) (suggesting that the lifetime payment requirement is
inconsistent with the policies of estate taxation and leads unnecessarily to inconsistent
conclusions). While such suggestions have strong policy justifications, as both Dean
Wolk and Professor Colliton point out, the broader issue they address is beyond the
scope of this article. The article seeks to develop a foundation for the sound application
of the aggregation rule given § 2039 as it currently exists. The author believes that if
the reach of § 2039 is to be broadened, Congress, not the Service or the courts, should
do so.
45. The manner in which the Service and the courts have construed the lifetime
payment requirement so as to make § 2039 applicable to survivor's benefits paid under
plans which provided for no payments to the employee is discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 98-108. That is not the type of payment Congress sought to include in
the gross estate by enacting § 2039. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
46. The leading example of this appears in Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305
F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962). In that case the Service used the decedent's rights to receive
payments under his employer's Sickness and Accident Plan to satisfy the lifetime pay-
ment requirement of § 2039(a). By aggregating the Sickness and Accident Plan with a
different and separate Survivor's Benefit Plan that provided exclusively for payments to
survivors, the Service succeeded in taxing a pure death benefit payment which the em-
ployer had made to the decedent's widow under the latter plan.
12
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3. The Qualified Plan Exclusion
a. Origin
From the time it was first introduced section 2039 excluded annuities
payable under qualified plans from the gross estate.' Although the legislative
history of section 2039 does not set forth the reason for the qualified plan
exclusion, the exclusion probably reflected a Congressional desire to give quali-
fied plans tax favored status to encourage their formation.48 Indeed, there
seems to be no other compelling reason for the exclusion. First, the policies
implemented by the federal estate tax do not require that the source of wealth
determine taxation at death.' Second, the status of a plan as qualified derives
47. I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1954). H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4017. Technically, § 2039(c) excluded payments received under quali-
fied plans not only from the coverage of § 2039 but from the estate tax provisions
generally. Prior to amendment by the 1984 Act, § 2039(c) provided that "notwith-
standing the provisions of this section or of any provision of law, there shall be ex-
cluded from the gross estate the value of an annuity or other payment. . . ." I.R.C. §
2039(c) (1979) (emphasis added). Thus, even though an annuity or other payment
which escapes inclusion in the gross estate under § 2039(a) can still be included if it
meets the requirements of another section (see, e.g., Estate of Barr, 40 T.C. 227 (1963)
(inclusion sought under §§ 2033 or 2039)), § 2039(c) exempted qualified plan annuities
from inclusion in the gross estate under any provision whatsoever. Cf. Estate of Perl v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 861, 863-66 (1981) (value of an insurance policy would have
been excluded from the decedent's gross estate if the court had been able to conclude
that it was provided under a pension plan).
48. Although H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4025, 4067 notes that "[t]he bill continues the
present policy of granting tax advantages to encourage the growth of qualified pension,
profit-sharing and stock bonus plans. . . " it does so in a general context, not in the
context of § 2039 and the estate taxation of distributions from such plans. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
49. The estate tax was designed to prevent large accumulations of wealth. New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 55-
56 (1900). The reasons for embracing such a policy were eloquently detailed by Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt in a speech which shortly preceded the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, 49 Stat. 1014 (1935), which imposed estate
taxes at rates up to 70 percent. In that 1935 speech, the President said:
The desire to provide security for one's self and one's family is natural and
wholesome, but it is adequately served by a reasonable inheritance. Great ac-
cumulations cannot be justified on the basis of personal and family security.
In the last analyses such accumulations amount to the perpetuation of great
and undesirable concentrations of control in a relatively few individuals over
the employment and welfare of many, many others. Such inherited power is
as inconsistent with the ideals of this generation as inherited political power
was inconsistent with the ideals of the generation which established our
government.
Address by Franklin D. Roosevelt, excerpted in SURREY, McDANIEL & GUTMAN, FED-
ERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 5-6 (succ. ed. 1987). President Roosevelt's beliefs
echoed those of Andrew Carnegie and Theodore Roosevelt. See Andrew Carnegie, The
Gospel of Wealth, reprinted in A. CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER
19881
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from the federal income tax law and need not have relevance to the estate
taxation of the proceeds received from the plan.5°
Nevertheless, Congress apparently reasoned that qualified plans would be
more attractive if such plans offered estate tax as well as income tax advan-
tages. The qualified plan exclusion encouraged employers to establish qualified
plans and encouraged employees to elect lifetime distribution in the form of a
joint and survivor annuity."1
TIMELY ESSAYS (1933); speech of Theodore Roosevelt, April 14, 1906, and Presidential
message of December 3, 1906, reprinted in 10 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 7042 (Richardson ed. 1911). For a history of the federal estate tax, see Casner,
American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, 22 TAX L. REv. 515,
518-32 (1967); Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. REv.
223 (1956); R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION (1942); A. TAIT, THE
TAXATION OF PERSONAL WEALTH (1967).
50. It is well established that although the estate and gift taxes should be con-
strued in pari materia (Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945); Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939)), the income and estate taxes need not be con-
strued in pari materia. Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814-15 (2d
Cir. 1947). As the Farid court recognized, the estate and gift tax provisions do not
implement the same policies and do not have the same objectives as the income tax
provisions. Id. It follows that they need not be construed the same way.
In the case of qualified plans, the factors that required special income tax treat-
ment do not require special estate tax treatment. Absent a provision like § 402(a),
pursuant to which an employee is taxed only when he or she actually receives a distri-
bution from a qualified plan, employees would be taxed when an employer made a
contribution on his or her behalf, as the doctrine of constructive receipt and § 83 would
require, particularly if the contribution were non-forfeitable. The prospect of facing
taxation on income which the employee has not received and probably would not re-
ceive for many years would make employer provided pension plans terminally unattrac-
tive to many employees. To make them attractive, Congress had to modify the normal
tax rules.
The problem that required special provisions in the income tax does not exist in
the case of the estate tax. Including qualified plan proceeds in an employee's gross
estate does not cause undue hardship because death will occasion a distribution of the
proceeds and the estate will therefore have the funds with which to pay the tax. Thus,
the policies which required favored income tax treatment of qualified plans do not re-
quire favored estate tax treatment.
51. The tax benefits attendant to qualified plans and to distributions from such
plans would make employers who offer them more attractive to employees than em-
ployers who do not offer them. An employee whose employer does not or could not
establish a qualified plan but pays the amounts as salary would not only face current
income taxation of the amounts received but also estate taxation of any amounts un-
consumed at his or her death. I.R.C. §§ 61, 2033 (1986). If the employer contributes
the amounts to a qualified plan but the employee received a lump sum distribution
upon retirement, the employee would avoid current income taxation but would face
estate taxation of amounts unconsumed at his or her death. I.R.C. §§ 402(a), 2033
(1986). By contrast, if the employer makes contributions to a qualified plan and the
employee receives a joint and survivor annuity upon retirement, the employee would
avoid both current income taxation of the amounts and estate taxation of the survivor
annuity. I.R.C. §§ 402(a), 2039(c) (1984). Any employee contributions to such a plan
would enjoy favorable income tax treatment but would nevertheless be subject to the
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/7
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
The exclusion thus implemented three desirable policies. First, it en-
couraged the establishment of qualified plans by making them more attractive
because they offered an estate tax advantage that non-qualified plans did
not.52 The exclusion thus ensured that the income and estate taxes would act
in unison to encourage the formation of retirement plans. Second, it en-
couraged employees to elect to receive lifetime distributions from a qualified
plan in the form of a joint and survivor annuity. The existence of the qualified
plan exclusion meant that the survivor portion of such an annuity would es-
cape estate taxation whereas the same total amounts, if paid to the employee
and left unconsumed at his or her death, would not.5" Third, it ensured that
surviving spouses would receive the full amount of the qualified plan death
benefit accrued by an individual during his or her life, undiminished by the
estate tax. In an era of low estate tax exemption amounts and a limited mari-
tal deduction, this was an important consideration."
Notwithstanding the range of policies served by providing an estate ex-
emption for distributions from income tax favored plans, the exclusion pro-
vided by section 2039(c) as originally enacted did not extend to all such
plans.55 The exclusion provided by section 2039(c) initially covered only plans
which satisfied the requirements of what are now sections 401(a) and 403(a).5
Section 401(a) covers qualified pension, profit sharing and stock bonus plans
while section 403(a) covers annuity plans.57
estate tax.
52. See supra note 51.
53. See supra note 51.
54. Until 1976, no more than $60,000 would pass free of the estate tax. I.R.C. §
2052 (1976). No more than $30,000 could pass free of the gift tax, I.R.C. § 2521
(1976) except to the extent covered by the present interest exclusion. I.R.C. § 2503
(1976). In 1976, when Congress replaced the section 2052 and 2521 exemptions with
the unified credit (I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505) no more than $120,666 could pass free of the
transfer taxes. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505, 2602(c) (1977). This amount rose to $175,625 in
1981. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505, 2602(c) (1981). In that year, Congress amended § 2010 to
increase the unified credit so that by 1988, it would reach $162,800 (I.R.C. §§ 2010,
2505), the equivalent of a $600,000 estate and gift exemption. Generation skipping
transfers are subject to a separate rate structure which provides generally for a
$1,000,000 lifetime exemption. I.R.C. § 2602 (1986).
As the foregoing illustrates, it was not until 1981 that the amounts which could
pass free of transfer taxes rose significantly. It is therefore not surprising that only
after 1981 did Congress begin significant erosion of the benefits provided by § 2039(c).
See infra text accompanying notes 66-67. Indeed, the substantial increase in the trans-
fer tax exemption equivalent and the advent of the unlimited marital deduction in 1981
may have made the repeal of the qualified plan exemption possible. See infra text ac-
companying notes 72-75.
55. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 111-24.
56. As originally enacted, § 2039(c) referred to retirement annuities which met
the requirements of § 401 (a)(3), but this cross reference was changed in 1962 to reflect
the amendment of §§ 401(a) and 403(a). Pub. L. No. 87-792, § 7(i) (1962). The
change was merely a technical one and did not affect the substantive coverage of
§ 2039(c). S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Session 55 (1961).
57. I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 403(a) (1986). Although §§ 401(a) and 403(a) plans differ
19881
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b. Expansion
It was not long before Congress expanded the scope of the exemption
provided by section 2039(c). Apparently realizing that the income tax also
gave favored treatment to some employee retirement benefits which were not
provided under section 401(a) and 403(a) plans, Congress quickly began to
add to the list of survivor benefits that would not be subject to federal estate
taxation by reason of section 2039(c). The first to be added, in 1958, were
annuities purchased by certain tax-exempt charitable organizations.58
Congress again expanded the list of annuities covered by the section
2039(c) exclusion in 1966, when it added annuities provided by the United
States government to certain members of the uniformed services.5 1 With both
the 1958 and 1966 amendments, Congress intended to round out the favored
tax status of such annuities.60
in the manner in which employers determine the amount of their contributions and in
the amount of benefits payable to the participants, both bear the burden of complying
with the non-discrimination rules of § 401(a)(4), the minimum participation standards
of § 410, the minimum vesting standards of § 411 and the minimum funding standards
of § 412. In addition, § 403(a) plans must also comply with most of the other provi-
sions of § 401(a) itself. In return for compliance with all of these requirements the
Code accords both types of plans favored income tax status. Thus, employers may de-
duct their contributions when made even though participants will not recognize any
income on account of such contributions until they actually receive them. I.R.C.
§§ 402(a), 404(a)(1) (1986). In addition, earnings on the amounts contributed to both
types of plans are not subject to income tax until distributed to the participants. I.R.C.§ 501(a) (1986).
58. Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 23(e), 72 Stat. 1622-23 (1958). The addition of these
annuities to the list of annuities covered by the § 2039(c) exclusion shows that the
exclusion itself arose from a desire to encourage employers to provide retirement bene-
fits to most of their employees. The legislative history of the 1958 amendments that
expanded § 2039 makes it clear that the primary aim of those amendments was to
subject charitable tax-exempt organizations to rules similar to the non-discrimination
rules which already applied to § 401(a) and 403(a) plans. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 91, 228, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4791,
4824, 4827. In return for making a tax-exempt organization's plans comply with these
rules, Congress thought it only fair to extend to them the same favorable tax treatment
already accorded § 401(a) and 403(a) plans. It therefore added such plans to the list
covered by § 2039(c). Although annuities provided by charitable, educational or reli-
gious organizations had to comply with the non-discrimination rules in order to ensure
that their employees received favorable income tax treatment, only annuities provided
by educational institutions which maintained a faculty, curriculum and a regularly en-
rolled student body and publicly supported charitable organizations were subject to the
§ 2039(c) exclusion. The legislative history provides no rationale for the existence of
this distinction. In addition to the § 2039(c) exclusion, Congress extended the § 101(b)
$5,000 income tax death benefit exclusion and the § 2517 gift tax exclusion to such
annuities.
59. Pub. L. No. 89-365, § 2(a), 80 Stat. 32, H.R. REP. No. 1118, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1966); S. REP. No. 1004, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 603, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1918.
60. Without special legislation, plans benefiting members of the uniformed ser-
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This pattern of extending the estate tax exclusion to annuities payable
under plans which enjoyed favored status under the income tax provisions con-
tinued into 1976. In that year, as part of a major revision of the wealth trans-
fer tax provisions, Congress added section 2039(e) to the Code. Section
2039(e) excluded from the gross estate any survivor annuities payable under
the individual retirement account provisions of section 408 or the retirement
bond provisions of section 409.61 In 1976 Congress also amended section
2039(c) to cover survivor annuities payable under qualified self-employed
plans (so-called Keogh or H.R. 10 plans).12 Again, Congress felt that if the
tax system was to encourage the establishment of retirement savings, all tax
provisions should operate toward that end.6
c. Contraction
Ironically, it was also in 1976 that Congress began to erode the scope of
the exclusion which 2039(c) had once provided. Believing that survivor bene-
fits paid in a lump sum would generate sufficient cash to pay any estate tax
attributable to their inclusion in a decedent's gross estate, Congress in 1976
made the section 2039(c) exclusion applicable only to benefits which either
were not paid in a lump sum or, if paid in a lump sum, were paid to a benefi-
ciary who elected to forgo the special 10-year averaging treatment then availa-
ble under the income tax provisions."' In 1978, Congress further tightened this
vices could not have taken advantage of the favorable tax treatment afforded qualified
plans. Although they complied with the non-discrimination rules, the uniformed ser-
vices plans did not comply with the funding requirements applicable to qualified plans.
See S. REP. No. 1004, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1918,
1920. Since compliance with the non-discrimination requirements is the cornerstone of
qualification, it followed that like qualified plans, plans covering members of the uni-
formed services should receive the favorable tax treatment accorded other qualified,
non-discriminatory plans. Congress therefore extended the same tax benefits to such
plans as were available to other qualified plans. The 1966 amendments made benefits
paid under uniformed services plans eligible for the § 101(b) $5,000 income tax death
benefit exclusion as well as the § 2517 gift tax exclusion. I.R.C. §§ 101(b)(2), 2517
(1986). In addition, the 1966 amendments provided for other income tax advantages
for service personnel and their beneficiaries. See I.R.C. §§ 72(o), 122(a) (1986).
61. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(1), 90 Stat. 1894 (1976). In 1976 Congress
attempted to integrate the estate and gift taxes by providing a single, unified rate struc-
ture and enacting the generation skipping tax. For an informative and comprehensive
description of the changes wrought by the 1976 legislation, see Surrey, Reflections on
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 303 (1976).
62. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1894 (1976).
63. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3356, 3422-23.
64. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(3), 90 Stat. 1894 (1976), H.R. REP. No. 94-
1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3356, 3422-23. This rationale for so limiting the availability of the § 2039(c) exclusion
is of questionable validity. First, Congress had never indicated that it had enacted §
2039 out of a concern for the liquidity of an estate which might be subject to tax on
the value of a survivor annuity. Indeed, to do so would have made no sense given that
17
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restriction so that the section 2039(c) exclusion would not apply to lump sum
distributions unless the beneficiary elected to forgo both 10-year averaging and
the special capital gains treatment accorded distributions attributable to pre-
1974 participation in a qualified plan.6 5 Congress apparently attempted to bal-
ance the desire to raise revenue with the desire to encourage savings through
qualified plans by making beneficiaries choose between favorable income tax
treatment and favorable estate tax treatment.
Not until 1982, did Congress examine the merits of the section 2039(c)
exclusion from an estate tax perspective. This examination led to the conclu-
sion that the section 2039(c) exclusion was regressive and not a proper part of
a transfer tax system.66 Although it was unwilling to eliminate the exclusion
altogether, in 1982 Congress limited the amount subject to the exclusion to
$100,000.17 However, the $100,000 limitation proved difficult to apply in prac-
an annuity under a non-qualified plan did not enjoy the exclusion although it would
encounter precisely the same type of liquidity problem, if any. Second, the Code al-
ready contained provisions designed specifically to deal with the liquidity problems
caused by the estate taxation of amounts payable in the future. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§
6166, 6161, 6163 (1986). Third, the § 2039(c) exclusion applied only to a payment
made to a beneficiary other than the executor. I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1984). Since any such
beneficiary has only secondary liability for payment of the estate tax, I.R.C. § 6324(a)
(1986), the theoretical existence of the cash with which to pay the tax in case of a
lump sum distribution may have little practical significance for the estate, which has
the primary liability for the payment of the tax. I.R.C. § 2002 (1986). Fourth, the
§ 2039(c) exclusion only applied to amounts attributable to employer contributions.
I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1984). It did not apply to amounts attributable to employee contri-
butions even though the same liquidity problems if any, faced both amounts. Id.
Congress appears to have been truly persuaded by the liquidity argument, how-
ever. The Conference on the 1976 legislation even used it to justify modifying the ex-
clusion for individual retirement account annuities so as to permit the exclusion only
where the schedule of payments would not provide funds with which the pay any re-
sulting federal estate tax. I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1986); Statement of Managers for Amend-
ment Numbered 35, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4246, 4262.
65. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 142(b), 92 Stat. 2796; Pub. L. No. 96-222,
§ 101(a)(8)(B), 94 Stat. 201 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 103(c)(9)(B), 96 Stat.
2377 (1982). The Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, revised
the entire structure of the lump sum distribution exception to the § 2039(c) exclusion
by taking it out of § 2039(c) itself and putting it in a new subsection, (f). Changes
made by Technical Corrections Acts passed after enactment of the 1978 Act completed
this revision effective as if all of the changes had been made as part of the 1978 legisla-
tion. Pub. L. No. 96-222, 94 Stat. 201 (1978); Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2377
(1978). The courts agree that the 1978 changes broadened the lump sum distribution
exception to cover both lump sum distributions for which the beneficiary used the 10-
year averaging provisions as well as those to which the special capital gain provisions
applied. Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 980 (1986); Giardina v. Com-
missioner, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 13,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), af'd, 776 F.2d 406
(2d Cir. 1985); Giardina v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 13,383 (D.
Md. 1980), affid without published opinion, 661 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1981).
66. See supra note 54.
67. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 245(a), (b), 96 Stat. 524; I.R.C. § 2039(g) (1986); see
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of
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tice. Among other things, it required an allocation in any case where the pay-
ments in question exceeded the excluded amount.6 8
d. Elimination
In 1984 Congress finally repealed the section 2039(c) exclusion. 9 The
1984 amendments to the Code repealed the section 2039(c) exclusion in all
but a limited number of cases relevant only to individuals domiciled in com-
munity property states.7 0 The exclusion was finally repealed in its entirety in
1986.71
Two factors contributed to the eventual repeal of the section 2039(c) ex-
clusion. First, Congress reasoned that the exclusion had become unnecessary
because in many cases the benefits in question would not be subject to the
estate tax.7 2 For example, even if amounts payable to a survivor under a quali-
fied plan were included in the decedent's gross estate, the amounts would qual-
ify for the unlimited marital deduction whenever a surviving spouse received
them.7 3 In such a case, no federal estate tax would actually be paid on the
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, at 285, 288 [hereinafter 1982
Blue Book]. This limitation also applied to annuities received under individual retire-
ment accounts and self-employed plans. I.R.C. § 2039(g) (1986); Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 245(a), (b), 96 Stat. 524 (1982); 1982 Blue Book, supra, at 288.
68. The need for allocation would arise because of the $100,000 exclusion. The
exclusion would have to be allocated among various distributions in every case where a
decedent participated in various plans. See Fair, Section 2039(g): The Death Knell for
Death Tax Exclusion, 8 J. OF PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIAN E 398 (1982); Frank,
Death Benefits Must be Reviewed in Light of $100,000 Exclusion Limitation Added
by TEFRA, 10 EST. PLAN. 2 (1983).
69. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 525(a), 98 Stat. 873 (1984); see JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, at 824 [hereinafter 1984 Blue Book].
70. DEFRA repealed § 2039(c) as it had theretofore existed. See supra note 8.
It replaced the previous § 2039(c) with a new § 2039(c), however. As it existed imme-
diately after DEFRA, § 2039(c) provided for the exclusion which was previously con-
tained in § 2039(d). This provision excluded from the gross estate of the spouse of an
employee covered by a qualified plan, as well as § 403(a) plans and plans established
by charitable organizations, the value of the interest which state community property
laws might give such spouse in the employee's plan.
71. The technical corrections provisions of TRA 1986 repealed § 2039(c) in its
entirety. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1852(e)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 2868 (1986). They also re-
pealed the gift tax exemption provided by § 2517. Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
1852(e)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 2868 (1986); see supra note 8.
72. 1984 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 824.
73. I.R.C. § 2056 (1986). The qualified plan proceeds would not constitute a
terminable interest in most cases because they would not pass to anyone else upon the
death of the surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1)(B) (1986). Even if the surviving
spouse's interest were otherwise terminable, it might be subject to the exceptions pro-
vided by § 2056(b)(6) (life insurance or annuity payments with power of appointment
in the surviving spouse), or § 2056(b)(7) (election for qualified terminable interest
property). Of course, if the survivor beneficiary was not the spouse, the annuity would
not qualify for the marital deduction.
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employee's transfer of those amounts.7' In addition, any estate tax generated
by including such benefits in a decedent gross estate could be offset by the
unified credit.7 6 Thus, even if the benefits did not qualify for the marital de-
duction, only employees possessing substantial wealth would actually have to
pay estate tax on them.
Second, Congress believed that the section 2039(c) exclusion was inappro-
priate because it was based on the source of the assets.7 6 If the estate tax is to
achieve its objective of preventing large accumulations of wealth, the source of
the wealth ought to be irrelevant.7
7
Even though Congress did not consider the estate taxation of pure death
benefits when it repealed the section 2039(c) exclusion, the Service could use
that repeal to sweep such benefits into the estate tax base. The Service would
do this by taking the position that qualified plans are now subject to
aggregation.
II. THE AGGREGATION RULE
A. Purpose
The regulations promulgated under section 2039 adopt a broad interpre-
tation of the post-death payment and contract requirements.7 8 They also adopt
74. The estate tax marital deduction is not subject to any dollar limitation.
I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1986). Any amounts transferred by the employee during his or her
lifetime would be eligible for the gift tax marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2523 (1986). The
gift tax marital deduction is not subject to any dollar limitation either. Id.
75. I.R.C. § 2010 (1986); 1984 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 824. The availabil-
ity of the unified credit is not a persuasive reason for the elimination of any estate or
gift tax exclusion because the unified credit is available for any estate tax liability
regardless of the type of assets that generates it. Perhaps the reference to the unified
credit simply indicates the regressive nature of the exclusion. Thus, the exclusion would
be of greatest benefit to the wealthiest individuals who would be subject to tax at the
highest rates if the amounts were included in the gross estate. The availability of the
unified credit would avoid estate tax liability for qualified plan proceeds only for indi-
viduals with taxable estates of less than $600,000. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2010 (1986).
76. 1984 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 824.
77. The repeal of the qualified plan exclusion does not imply that Congress no
longer wishes to encourage the formation and funding of qualified plans. It only means
that Congress has realized that estate and gift tax preferences are all highly regressive
and not needed to encourage the formation and maintenance of such plans. See supra
note 50, and text accompanying notes 66-67.
78. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) provides:
The terms "annuity or other payment" as used with respect to both the dece-
dent and the beneficiary has reference to one or more payments extending
over any period of time. The payments may be over any period of time. The
payments may be equal or unequal, conditional or unconditional, periodic or
sporadic. The term "contract or agreement" includes any arrangement, un-
derstanding or plan, or any combination of arrangements, understandings or
plans arising by reason of the decedent's employment.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) (1976).
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a broad interpretation of the lifetime payment requirement.79 The text of the
regulations suggests the aggregation rule by defining the term "contract or
agreement" to include "any combination of arrangements, understandings or
plans arising by reason of the decedent's employment." 80 The aggregation rule
is clearly set out, however, in the often cited Example 6.81
Example 6 posits an employer which had established two plans.82 The
plans were established at different times and were administered separately in
every respect. Neither plan was qualified under section 401(a). Under one
plan, an employee was to receive a single life annuity upon retirement. Under
the other plan the employee's designated beneficiary was to receive a single
life annuity beginning at the employee's death. The example concludes that
the employee's gross estate will include the value of the survivor's annuity be-
cause "all rights and benefits accruing to an employee and to others by reason
of the employment ... are considered together in determining whether or not
section 2039(a) and (b) apply."83 That is the aggregation rule.
The need for the aggregation rule is obvious. The two plans described in
79. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) further provides:
An annuity or other payment "was payable" to the decedent if, at the time of
his death, the decedent was in fact receiving an annuity or other payment,
whether or not he had an enforceable right to have the payments continued.
The decedent "possessed the right to receive" an annuity or other payment if,
immediately before his death, the decedent had an enforceable right to re-
ceive payments at some time in the future, whether or not, at the time of his
death, he had a present right to receive payments. In connection with the
preceding sentence, the decedent will be regarded as having had "an enforce-
able right to receive payments at some time in the future" so long as he had
complied with his obligations under the contract or agreement up to the time
of his death. For the meaning of the phrase "for his life for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death," see section 2036 and § 20.2036-1.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) (1976).
80. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6 (1976).
81. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6 (1976).
82. Example 6 provides:
The employer made contributions to two different funds set up under two
different plans. One plan was to provide the employee upon his retirement at
age 60, with an annuity for life, and the other plan was to provide the em-
ployee's designated beneficiary upon the employee's death, with a similar an-
nuity for life. Each plan was established at a different time and each plan was
administered separately in every respect. Neither plan at any time met the
requirements of section 401(a) (relating to qualified plans). The value of the
designated beneficiary's annuity is includible in the employee's gross estate.
All rights and benefits accruing to an employee and to others by reason of the
employment (except rights and benefits accruing under certain plans meeting
the requirements of section 401(a) (see § 20.2039-2)) are considered together
in determining whether or not section 2039(a) and (b) apply. The scope of
section 2039(a) and (b) cannot be limited by indirection.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6 (1976).
83. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6 (1976).
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Example 6 have the same effect as a joint and survivor annuity and should be
taxed accordingly.8 The aggregation rule ensures that they will be.85 The ag-
84. Without the aggregation rule, the benefits provided under both plans de-
scribed in example 6 would have escaped inclusion in the employee's gross estate. The
annuity under the first plan would not have been included in the employee's gross es-
tate. A single life annuity, like any property in which a decedent has only a life inter-
est, would not be included in the decedent's gross estate under this provision because
the decedent's interest terminates with his or her death. See, e.g., Estate of Stinchfield
v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. 511 (1945), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 555 (9th Cir,
1947). Section 2039 would not have applied because there was no payment to a survi-
vor under that plan.
The annuity under the second plan would probably not have been included in the
employee's gross estate either. Because the decedent had no rights to receive any
amounts under the second contract, it would be difficult to conclude that he or she had
an interest in it which could be included in his or her gross estate under § 2033. See
Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), a fTd on other grounds, 99 F.2d
799 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1938); Estate of
Salt v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 92 (1951); Estate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227
(1963). But see Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971). While
the Service might take the position that the benefits payable under the second contract
were in the nature of deferred compensation to the decedent and should therefore be
included in his or her gross estate under section 2033, it is not clear that such an
agreement would succeed given that the decedent possessed no rights to receive the
amounts. But see Estate of Garber v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959);
Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Es-
tate of Wolf v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 441 (1957); Estate of King v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 930 (1953).
The absence of any rights in the decedent under the second contract might also
preclude its inclusion in the decedent's gross estate under the retained interest provi-
sions, i.e., §§ 2036, 2037, 2038, or even 2041. All of those provisions require the dece-
dent to have held rights or powers with respect to the property. I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037,
2041 (1986). While aggregating the two contracts might result in inclusion of the sur-
vivor's benefits payable under the second contract in the decedent's gross estate as a
transfer with a retained life estate under § 2036, aggregation for purposes of § 2036
would have been unlikely in the absence of a statutory or regulatory directive.
In order for § 2036 to apply, a decedent has to have had an interest in the prop-
erty. Absent aggregation, the decedent would have had no interest in the second con-
tract. In the case of the first contract, the decedent's interest amounts only to a life
estate; because the transfer of a life estate does not result in inclusion under § 2036,
the first contract would not be included in the decedent's gross estate under that sec-
tion. See Rev. Rul. 66-86, 1966-1 C.B. 216 (transfer of a life estate into a trust does
not cause inclusion of the trust res in the transferor's estate under § 2036); Rev. Rul.
70-84, 1970-1 C.B. 188 (trust established by decedent entitled to receive a fixed
monthly sum for life, but who received the amounts as a lump sum, found not includi-
ble in her gross estate under § 2036). But see Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118
F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 634 (1941).
It would also have been difficult to argue successfully that the value of the benefits
payable under the second contract should be included in the decedent's gross estate as
insurance under § 2042. An annuity does not possess either of the key elements of
insurance: risk shifting and risk distribution. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith,
356 U.S. 274 (1958); see All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1963); Estate of
Montgomery v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 489 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 616
(5th Cir. 1972); Sussman v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 13,126
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gregation rule accomplishes this by allowing the lifetime payments which the
first plan provides to satisfy the lifetime payment requirement which the sec-
ond plan alone does not satisfy. 8  The rule therefore prevents individuals from
avoiding section 2039 by splitting what is in substance one joint and survivor
annuity into two single life annuities. Its function is sound and easy to under-
stand. It is more difficult to understand why the Treasury excepted qualified
plans from the coverage of the rule.
B. Qualified Plan Exception
Example 6 not only establishes that neither of the plans in question is
qualified but goes on to explain specifically that the rights and benefits to be
aggregated include "[a]ll rights and benefits accruing to an employee and to
others by reason of the employment (except rights and benefits accruing under
certain plans meeting the requirements of section 401(a) (see §20.2039-2))...
."87 In Rev. Rul. 76-380,8s the Service confirmed that the parenthetical state-
ment in Example 6 excepted qualified plans from aggregation.8 9 Neither the
example, the text of the regulations nor the ruling explains the reason for ex-
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
Finally, § 2039 would not have applied either. Although the annuity under that
plan would satisfy the payment and contract requirements of § 2039, it could not have
satisfied the lifetime payment requirement. Under the second plan the employee pos-
sessed no right to receive any payments during his or her lifetime.
The aggregation rule solves this problem by treating the two plans as one contract
or agreement. If the contract or agreement which gives the employee a single life annu-
ity and thus fulfills the lifetime payment requirement is the same contract or agree-
ment which provides the survivor's annuity, then the employee can be found to have
been entitled to lifetime payments under "such contract or agreement." The lifetime
payment requirement will thus be satisfied and § 2039 will apply. The value of the
survivor's annuity will therefore be included in the employee's gross estate.
85. The aggregated plan satisfies the contract requirement, as did the two sepa-
rate plans. More significantly, it also satisfies the post-death payment requirement be-
cause it provides for payments to the survivor beneficiary. Finally, the aggregated plan
also satisfies the lifetime payment requirement because under it the individual had the
right to receive payments during his or her lifetime as a result of the provisions of the
first contract.
86. Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1979); Gray
v. United States, 410 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir. 1969); All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633,
636 (2d Cir. 1963); Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269, 274 (1966); Estate of
Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827, 830 (Ct. Cl. 1962); see Silberman v. United
States, 333 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Hetson v. United States, 209 Ct. Cl. 691
(1976); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Siegel v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613 (1980).
87. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6 (1976).
88. 1976-2 C.B. 270.
89. Rev. Rul. 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270, stated that the Service interpreted a
statement in example 6 of Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) to mean that "rights and
benefits accruing under plans meeting the requirements of section 401(a) of the Code
are not to be considered together with rights and benefits accruing under plans not
meeting the requirements of section 401(a)."
1988]
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cepting qualified plans from the aggregation rule.
The cross reference to Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2, which describes and ap-
plies the section 2039(c) exclusion, suggests that the Treasury saw a relation-
ship between the qualified plan exception to the aggregation rule and the pecu-
liarities of the section 2039(c) exclusion. The cross reference suggests that
Treasury intended that the qualified plan exception to the aggregation rule be
co-extensive with the section 2039(c) exclusion from the gross estate. No other
compelling reason for it exists.
Given that section 401(a) is extensive, detailed and self-executing, a cross
reference to section 401(a) alone would have sufficed to except section 401(a)
plans from the aggregation rule. Indeed, section 2039(c) itself did no more
than refer to plans which "met the requirements of section 401 (a)."'90 If Trea-
sury had wanted to except section 401(a) or section 403(a) plans from the
aggregation rule without regard to the estate taxation of the benefits provided
under those plans, citation to those sections alone would have sufficed.
Treasury needed the cross reference to Treas. Reg. §20.2039-2 and, by
inference, to section 2039(c), if it sought to narrow the type of section 401(a)
plans that would enjoy the exception from the aggregation rule. Notably, Ex-
ample 6 provides that the exception from the aggregation rule applies only to
"certain" section 402(a) plans.91 The cross reference to section 20.2039-2 of
the regulations is superfluous unless it was intended to define which qualified
plans would be excepted from the aggregation rule.
For example, section 2039(c), and therefore section 20.2039-2 of the reg-
ulations, does not exclude survivor annuities paid by all qualified plans from
the gross estate.92 Treasury would have needed the cross reference to section
20.2039-2 of the regulations if it had wanted to make the qualified plan excep-
tion from the aggregation rule co-extensive with the section 2039(c) exclusion
from the gross estate. A reference to section 401(a) alone would not have
sufficed.
Since Treasury apparently intended for the section 2039(c) exclusion to
be co-extensive with the qualified plan exception from the aggregation rule,
the repeal of the exclusion raises the question of the continued vitality of the
90. I.R.C. § 2039(c)(1) prior to amendment by TRA 1984.
91. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) example 6 (1976); see supra text accompany-
ing note 87.
92. I.R.C. § 2039(c)(1) (1984). For example, § 2039(c) only excluded proceeds
from a plan that met the requirements of § 401(a) either at the time the decedent's
employment terminated or at the time the plan itself terminated, if earlier. Section
2039(c) would not have excluded from an employee's gross estate survivor benefits paid
by a plan which was not qualified when the employee retired but which was qualified
when the employee died. Treas. Reg. § 2039-2(b)(1) (1976). The cross reference in
example 6 suggests that such a plan would not be excepted from the aggregation rule
because the value of survivor benefits payable by such a plan would be included in the
employee's gross estate. Mere reference to § 401(a) in example 6 might have yielded a
different result because the survivor annuity would have been paid by a qualified plan.
[Vol. 53
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qualified plan exception from the aggregation rule.93 This question cannot be
answered without an understanding of the way in which the Service and the
courts have interpreted the aggregation rule.
III. APPLICATION OF THE LIFETIME PAYMENT REQUIREMENT AND THE
AGGREGATION RULE
The Service recognizes the importance of the aggregation rule. In light of
the breadth with which the courts have construed the contract and post-death
payment requirements of section 2039, broad construction of the lifetime pay-
ment requirement together with the aggregation rule could result in the inclu-
sion of nearly all non-qualified survivor's benefits in an employee's gross estate.
The Service has therefore taken some rather extreme positions in what appears
to have been an attempt to set the outer limits of the lifetime payment require-
ment and the aggregation rule.9
The positions the Service has taken do not follow from either the purpose
for the aggregation rule or the purpose for the lifetime payment requirement.
They appear to follow only from a naked desire to raise revenue. Nevertheless,
the Service's attempts to expand the scope of the aggregation rule and the
lifetime payment requirement beyond the purpose for which they were in-
tended have generated a confusing and seemingly contradictory body of law.
This body of law is in disarray for two reasons. First, both the Service
and the courts have failed to distinguish between the issue of satisfying the
lifetime payment requirement and the issue of aggregation.9" Logically, these
are two separate issues which must be decided sequentially. If an amount fails
to meet the lifetime payment requirement, aggregation is irrelevant. It is only
when an amount satisfies the lifetime payment requirement that aggregation
will result in inclusion of the survivor's benefit in the decedent's gross estate.
Therefore, the appropriate analysis must first focus on fulfillment of the life-
time payment requirement; aggregation is irrelevant. It is only when an
amount satisfies the lifetime payment requirement that aggregation will result
in inclusion of the survivor's benefit in the decedent's gross estate. Therefore,
93. The scope of the qualified plan exception from the aggregation rule needs to
be addressed even if Treasury and the Service did not intend that the exception depend
on the § 2039(c) exclusion. First, the phrasing of the exception in both Treas. Reg. §
20.2039-(l)(b)(2) example 6 suggests the dependency and raises a question about the
effect of the repeal of the § 2039(c) exclusion. A clearly articulated expression of the
aggregation rule would resolve that question. Second, the cross reference to Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2039-2 raises the possibility that other plan benefits subject to the § 2039(c) ex-
clusion might also be excepted from the aggregation rule. Neither the regulation nor
the Service's rulings provide a mechanism for determining the scope of the exception.
The two pronged test proposed here would provide this mechanism.
94. The Service has needed to take extreme positions because pure death benefits
which fail the lifetime payment requirement could probably escape inclusion in the
gross estate under §§ 2033, 2035, 2036, 2037 and 2038. For an excellent and exhaus-
tive discussion of why this would be so, see Wolk, supra note 40, at 235-64.
95. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
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the appropriate analysis must first focus on fulfillment of the lifetime payment
requirement. Only after it is determined that the payment in question satisfies
the lifetime payment requirement should the analysis proceed to the question
of aggregation. 6
Second, neither the Service nor the courts have articulated a standard for
deciding what constitutes a lifetime payment or what plans should be aggre-
gated.9 7 Instead, they have made pronouncements that make little sense and
provide scant guidance for future application. It is hardly surprising that the
law on the aggregation of employee benefits under section 2039 is a morass.
Nevertheless, a review of this body of law will provide the foundation for the
analytically sound formulation of the lifetime payment requirement and the
aggregation rule which this article seeks to develop. Like the test which this
article will propose, the review should begin with a study of the lifetime pay-
ment requirement.
A. Scope of the Lifetime Payment Requirement
The Service first sought to construe the lifetime payment requirement so
broadly that all plans would satisfy it. The Service did this by looking to the
most common type of lifetime payment which an employee receives from an
employer: the payment of salary.
1. Judicial Response
In Estate of Fusz,98 the Service took the position that an employee's right
to receive a salary under the terms of an employment contract fulfilled the
lifetime payment requirement. 99 The employment contract in question pro-
96. If an amount receivable during an employee's lifetime is not an "annuity or
other payment" within the meaning of § 2039(a), then it cannot satisfy the lifetime
payment requirement. Therefore, even if a plan which provides for payment of such an
amount were aggregated with a particular pure death benefit, the death benefit would
escape inclusion in the gross estate because it would fail to satisfy the lifetime payment
requirement.
The foregoing suggests that in order for the aggregation rule to result in inclusion
of a pure death benefit in a decedent's gross estate, two conditions must be satisfied.
First, there has to have been a contract or agreement under which the decedent was
entitled to receive an "annuity or other payment" during his or her lifetime. Second,
that contract or agreement has to be aggregated with the contract or agreement which
provides for the payment of the pure death benefit to the survivor.
97. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 111-24.
98. 46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq. in result, 1967-2 C.B. 2.
99. Fusz was evidently a test case. The Tax Court realized that the Service de-
liberately refrained from pressing any other theories for including the survivor's bene-
fits in the employee's gross estate. Id. at 215 n.2. In the opening sentence of its opinion
in Fusz the court noted that "[iun asserting includability in the estate of decedent of
the commuted value of the payments to his widow, respondent has shot from his bow
the single arrow of section 2039(a); he has deliberately left other possible arrows
locked in his quiver." Id. at 215 (footnotes omitted). The Service apparently wanted to
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vided that the employee would receive a salary and that upon his death his
widow would receive payments in specified amounts for a specified period of
time.100 Because the death benefit payments to the widow failed to meet the
lifetime payment requirement, the Service took the position that since the sal-
ary due the employee was payable during his lifetime, the salary would satisfy
the lifetime payment requirement. 101
The Tax Court did not agree. Reasoning that Congress intended to tax
joint and survivor annuities but not all death benefits under section 2039, the
Tax Court articulated the first limitation on the scope of the lifetime payment
requirement.1 0 2 Based on the legislative history of section 2039 the Tax Court
concluded that amounts would not constitute "other payments" which would
satisfy the lifetime payment requirement unless they were "post-employment
benefits which, at the very least, are paid or payable during the decedent's
lifetime."10 3 Salary payments, almost by definition, are not post-employment
benefits. Therefore, the employee's right to receive a salary for services ren-
dered during his lifetime would not qualify as a right to receive an "other
payment" for purposes of section 2039.1" Fusz thus established that salary
would not satisfy the lifetime payment requirement of section 2039(a).
2. Administrative Acquiescence
The Service acquiesced in the Tax Court's decision in Fusz.105 Although
force the court to decide the scope of § 2039. See infra note 101. Although the Service
had previously taken the position that all incidents of the employment relationship,
including salary, should be taken as a whole for purposes of determining whether the
requirements of § 2039 were satisfied, it had not obtained a decision in a case which
presented purely the issue of whether salary could constitute an "other payment" for
purposes of the lifetime payment requirement of § 2039. Thus, in Estate of Bahen v.
United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962), the Service also argued that the decedent's
salary was an "other payment." See also Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484,
491 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Estate of Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. CL.
1969). The court rejected the Service's argument in Bahen, reasoning that to accept it
would be to nullify the lifetime payment requirement. Bahen, 305 F.2d at 834. The
court did not discuss the issue at length, however, because there were other amounts
which, in its opinion, did constitute "other payments." See infra text accompanying
note 136.
100. Fusz, 46 T.C. at 215.
101. Id. at 215-16. The amounts due the widow were an annuity or other pay-
ment and were paid under a contract or agreement, thus satisfying the first two re-
quirements of § 2039(a). But the amounts due the widow were not part of a joint and
survivor annuity. Under the employment contract the decedent did not have any right
to receive any lifetime payments other than his salary. Arguably, then, the payments to
the widow failed to meet the lifetime payment requirement. Recognizing this, the Ser-
vice took the position that since the salary due the decedent was payable during his
lifetime, the salary would satisfy the lifetime payment requirement.
102. Fusz, 46 T.C. at 217.
103. Id. at 218 (footnote omitted).
104. See id. at 217-18.
105. 1967-2 C.B. 2; see Rev. Rul. 77-183, 1977-1 C.B. 274.
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it sometimes disagrees with taxpayers over whether a particular amount is a
post-employment benefit as contemplated by the Tax Court, 0 6 the Service has
been willing to limit its construction of the lifetime payment requirement in
accordance with the Tax Court's rationale in Fusz.107 It now agrees that to be
an "other payment" for purposes of the lifetime payment requirement of sec-
tion 2039(a) a payment must be a post-employment benefit."0 8
The Service's acquiescence in Fusz and its acceptance of the rationale
articulated by the court in that case is important because the Fusz rationale is
consistent with the purpose of the lifetime payment requirement and repre-
sents an analytically sound approach to its application. The lifetime payment
requirement mirrors one of the salient characteristics of the prototypical joint
and survivor annuity: the making of payments to the primary annuitant during
his or her lifetime. An employee's receipt of salary is totally unlike the receipt
of payments under a joint and survivor annuity.1 0 9
Unlike the receipt of salary, the receipt of an annuity is not inextricably
tied to the employment relationship.110 Unlike the payment of salary, the pay-
106. See, e.g., Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(insurance renewal commissions payable during employee's lifetime and to his widow
pursuant to agreement with employer held not post-employment payments; however,
such payments were includible in decedent's gross estate under § 2033 as property in
which decedent had an interest at the time of his death and alternatively includible
under § 2039(a) and (b) when considered together with a deferred compensation agree-
ment that entitled decedent to a post-employment annuity); Silberman v. United
States, 333 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (consulting payments held post-employ-
ment benefits because they continued regardless of the employee's ability to perform
services); Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613 (1980) (agreement which pro-
vided for payments to the employee in the event of disability did not provide for post-
employment benefits); Hetson v. United States, 209 Ct. CL. 691 (1976) (commuted
value of pension payments receivable by widow under an agreement providing that
husband would be paid a salary regardless of time devoted to corporation or ability to
perform services and that upon his death widow would receive $13,000 per year in
consideration of his services held includible in decedent's gross estate as an annuity or
other payment); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (wage contin-
uation payments for decedent's services as an advisor were not post-employment pay-
ments; decedent apparently could not receive payments if he performed no services).
107. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-183, 1977-1 C.B. 274.
108. Id.
109. Although it is conceivable that an employee would agree to receive in-
creased salary in lieu of a post-employment single life annuity (as a kind of reverse
deferred compensation), that is highly unlikely because of the disadvantages of imme-
diate taxation. The mere existence of the possibility should not form the basis for con-
cluding that salary should satisfy the lifetime payment requirement. To do so would be
to allow a remote and difficult to establish possibility to dictate the scope of a rule
which has very general application.
110. The term salary is used here in a generic sense to represent all cash com-
pensation for services rendered by employees. The term includes amounts paid to em-
ployees who are compensated on an hourly basis as well as amounts paid to employees
who receive a specific amount per period. The term excludes non-cash compensation
and fringe benefits.
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ment of an annuity typically begins after the employment relationship termi-
nates. The individual needs to perform no services to receive the annuity pay-
ments. Salary is base compensation. Annuity payments are not.
The Tax Court recognized these fundamental differences between salary
and the payments due under an annuity. Its refusal to find that salary fulfilled
the lifetime payment requirement in Fusz mooted the question of aggregation.
By acquiescing in Fusz the Service laid the foundation for an analytically
sound approach to the application of the lifetime payment requirement and
the aggregation rule. Regrettably, instead of building on that foundation, the
Service trampled it.
B. The Analysis Goes Awry
In 1977 the Service published a ruling in which it appeared to expand the
rationale articulated by the Tax Court in Fusz. In Rev. Rul. 77-183111 the
Service held that payments which an employee was entitled to receive under
an employer's Sickness and Accident Income Plan did not satisfy the lifetime
payment requirement. Under the terms of the Plan described in the ruling an
employee would continue to receive his or her salary for a specified period of
time if he or she were absent from work as a result of sickness or injury.1 12
The Service noted that the employee was expected to return to work after the
period of incapacity. It therefore concluded that payments under the Plan did
not satisfy the lifetime payment requirement.1 23
Although the Service purported only to apply the Fusz rationale to the
facts posited in Rev. Rul. 77-183, its conclusion and its description of that
rationale were, in fact, a significant and analytically unjustified extension of it.
In Rev. Rul. 77-183 the Service interpreted Fusz to exclude from the defini-
tion of "other payments," and thus from fulfillment of the lifetime payment
requirement, any "rights and benefits to receive compensation for services ac-
tually rendered or to be rendered. 11 4 Such a formulation of the Fusz rationale
would mean that no amounts which are compensatory in nature could ever
fulfill the lifetime payment requirement.
Indeed, the Service has so stated. In Rev. Rul. 77-183 it concluded that
the benefits which an employee would receive under the Plan in question in
that ruling were "in the nature of compensation" and therefore could not be
an "annuity or other payment" which fulfilled the lifetime payment require-
ment of section 2039(a).115
The Service could not possibly have meant what it said. It is difficult to
conceive of any significant pecuniary benefit that an employer bestows upon an
employee that is not in the nature of compensation for services rendered or to
111. Rev. Rul. 77-183, 1977-1 C.B. 274.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 275.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 276.
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be rendered. The Service itself has often taken the position that any property
transferred by an employer to an employee must represent compensation.110
Thus, the Service has long sought to treat as income the value of almost all
fringe benefits which employers provide for employees. 117 The Code even
presumes the compensatory nature of payments made by employers to or for
the benefit of employees by forbidding their characterization as gifts." 8 If the
Service really excluded all compensatory payments from the definition of
"other payments" for purposes of the lifetime payment requirement, few em-
ployer-provided payments would ever fulfill the requirement.
In addition, if Fusz really stood for the proposition that compensatory
payments cannot fulfill the lifetime payment requirement, then even the pay-
ments under the prototypical joint and survivor annuity would fail to meet the
requirement. Certainly, such payments compensate the employee for services
rendered. 1 9 An employer would not provide such an annuity if the employee
had not worked for the employer. If such payments were not compensatory,
116. For example, the Service has long taken the position that amounts paid by
an employer to an employee's surviving spouse is income to that spouse. Although the
federal district and appellate courts have not agreed, (see, e.g., Harper v. Commis-
sioner, 314 F. Supp. 360 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 454 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971); Kuntz
v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962)), the
Tax Court usually has agreed with the Service and held that such amounts were not
gifts but were income to the surviving spouse. See, e.g., Olsen v. Commissioner, 20
T.C.M. 897 (1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962);
Waters v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 1258 (1963). The issue has probably been settled
by the enactment of § 102(c) in 1986. TRA 1986, § 122(b). That section provides that
amounts transferred by an employer to or for the benefit of an employee will not be
excluded from income under the provisions of § 102(a), which generally excludes gifts
and inheritances. By enacting § 102(c) and virtually eliminating the exclusion available
under § 74 (relating to prizes and awards) (see TRA 1986, § 122(a)), Congress hoped
to resolve the uncertainties of prior law. 1986 Blue Book at 32-33, 37. Congress also
acknowledged that such amounts represent compensation.
117. With the exception of gains specifically exempted by statute, the courts
have broadly construed § 61 to include in gross income many forms of employee bene-
fits. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955). The in-
crease in the types and use of employer-provided fringe benefits prompted the Treasury
Department in 1975 to issue a discussion draft of proposed regulations to determine the
tax treatment of non-statutory fringe benefits. 40 Fed. Reg. 4118 (1975). The public
reacted so adversely to the positions taken in that proposal that Treasury eventually
withdrew it. 41 Fed. Reg. 5634 (1976). In 1978, Congress enacted a moratorium
prohibiting the Treasury Department from issuing final regulations addressing the
fringe benefit issue until 1980. Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996 (1978). Two
extensions of the moratorium followed. Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275; Pub. L.
No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat. 349 (1981). Finally, as part of TRA 1984, Congress
amended § 61(a) and added new § 132 to clarify the income and payroll tax treatment
of fringe benefits. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531, 98 Stat. 877 (1984). The enactment of
§ 132 resolved some of the issues raised by the previously proposed regulations and
effectively prevented their issuance as final regulations under § 61.
118. I.R.C. § 102(c) (1986).
119. The Service itself has so argued in all of the cases in which it has attempted
to treat death benefits paid to a surviving spouse as income. See supra note 106.
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none of the special rules which defer income taxation of employer contribu-
tions to qualified plans would be necessary. 120 That the rules exist and that the
consequence of running afoul of them is immediate taxation to the employee
shows that Congress and the Service agree that such payments are
compensatory. 121
That section 2039(c) existed to exclude qualified plan payments from the
gross estate for over 30 years also shows that compensatory payments could
indeed satisfy the lifetime payment requirement. The amounts payable to the
employee during his or her lifetime under a qualified plan are clearly compen-
satory in nature, as explained above. If that had prevented such amounts from
fulfilling the lifetime payment requirement, then the survivor's annuity paya-
ble under a qualified plan could not have been included in the employee's gross
estate under section 2039. The plan would have failed to meet the lifetime
payment requirement. That section 2039(c) was needed to exclude the value of
such an annuity from the employee's gross estate shows that a qualified plan
providing for lifetime payments to the employee would meet the lifetime pay-
ment requirement even though those payments could be nothing but
compensatory.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the very existence of section 2039(c)
shows that the Service could not have meant to bar the use of compensatory
payments to fulfill the lifetime payment requirement. Its actions subsequent to
the issuance of Rev. Rul. 77-183 show that compensatory payments could in-
deed fulfill the lifetime payment requirement notwithstanding the broad lan-
guage of that ruling.
Even after 1977, the Service had little difficulty in arguing that payments
which an employee was entitled to receive under a non-qualified pension plan,
120. If the payments were not compensation and thus included in the employee's
income under §§ 61 or 83, § 402(a), which provides that amounts contributed to a
qualified plan will be included in the employee's income when distributed, would not be
necessary. Similarly, Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i) (1985), which provides specifi-
cally that "the employee is not required to include [the amount of the employer's]
contribution in his income except for the year or years in which such contribution is
distributed or made available to him," would be superfluous if §§ 61 and 83 did not
require inclusion of such amounts in the employee's income at the time the contribution
is made.
121. Indeed, § 2039 itself shows that Congress recognized the compensatory na-
ture of amounts expended by an employer on behalf of an employee. Section 2039(b)
provides that any amount contributed by an employer to purchase an annuity contract
or agreement will be treated as contributed by the employee. The provision has the
effect of making such amounts subject to the estate tax precisely as if the employee
contributed them. See also Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl.
1962); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 471, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5115. In the case of employer's contributions to qualified plans,
§ 2039(c) (1974) provided that such contributions would not be treated as employee
contributions for purposes of § 2039(c) only. This had the effect of making amounts
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which clearly are compensatory, fulfilled the lifetime payment requirement.122
The courts have rightfully agreed. 123Pension payments differ from salary not
because one is compensatory and the other not, but because salary is paid
during the period of employment while pension payments are not. The Tax
Court understood this in Fusz.12 ' The Service's unfortunate mischaracteriza-
tion of the Fusz rationale in Rev. Rul. 77-183 has only confused both the
lifetime payment requirement and the aggregation rule. A more analytically
sound explanation of both is necessary to understand the way in which quali-
fied plan payments should be treated. The Fusz rationale and the purpose of
the aggregation rule provide the tools for that analysis.
IV. TOWARD A MORE SOUND ANALYSIS
A. Qualitative Similarity, The First Prong
1. Scope of the Lifetime Payment Requirement
The Fusz rationale, properly articulated, requires that only amounts due
for a period following the termination of employment be found to constitute an
"other payment" for purposes of the lifetime payment requirement.1 25 Only
these amounts are qualitatively similar to amounts due under a joint and sur-
vivor annuity.
Qualitative similarity to a joint and survivor annuity, not compensatory
nature, should be the test. Since Congress modelled the requirements of sec-
tion 2039(a) on the joint and survivor annuity, the joint and survivor annuity
ought to serve as the focal point in the interpretation of those requirements. 126
To construe the requirements so as to encompass amounts other than those
which are qualitatively similar to a joint and survivor annuity does violence to
the congressional intent behind the enactment of section 2039.
The Fusz court recognized this when it held that an amount had to re-
present a post-employment benefit in order to satisfy the lifetime payment re-
quirement of section 2039. Payments due under an employer-provided joint
and survivor annuity represent a post-employment benefit. The Service, after
122. The Tax Court has even begun to apply precisely such a test even though it
has not defined it. Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 620 (1980); see, e.g.,
Estate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964); Estate of Beal v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269 (1966); Estate of Allen, 39 T.C. 817 (1963).
123. See supra note 121.
124. In Fusz the Tax Court specifically stated that the term "other payment" for
purpose of the lifetime payment requirement was "qualitatively limited to post-employ-
ment benefits. . . ." Estate of Fusz, 46 T.C. 214, 218 (1966), acq. in result, 1967-2
C.B. 2.
125. Fusz itself addressed only the question of the definition of "other payment."
The Service did not argue that salary was an annuity. The post-employment component
which the Fusz court injected into its definition of "other payment" is already a part of
the term "annuity." Id. at 216.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
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acquiescing in Fusz, incorrectly applied that court's rationale when it held, in
Rev. Rul. 77-183, that amounts due under a Sickness and Accident Plan were
not "other payments" for purposes of the lifetime payment requirement be-
cause they were compensatory in nature.
2 7
Although the Service reached the correct conclusion in the ruling, it did
so for the wrong reason. The Service should have analyzed, as did Congress
when it enacted section 2039 and the Fusz court when it decided that salary
did not fulfill the lifetime payment requirement, whether the payments due
under the plan described in Rev. Rul. 77-183 were qualitatively similar to
those due under a joint and survivor annuity. They were not.
Payments due an employee under an employer-provided joint and survivor
annuity begin after termination of employment. They are retirement pay-
ments. As such, they have two salient characteristics. First, they are due to
follow the voluntary or chronological termination of employment. Second, they
depend only upon the employee's survival.
Payments due under the Sickness and Accident Plan at issue in Rev. Rul.
77-183 possessed neither of these characteristics. Although they were intended
to provide a source of support during a period of absence from employment,
the absence resulted not from the voluntary or chronological termination of
employment but from the enforced, and perhaps temporary, cessation of em-
ployment. This fundamental difference in the circumstance that occasioned the
cessation of employment made the payments qualitatively different.
In addition, the payments due under the Sickness and Accident Plan were
not certain. Payment was contingent upon the employee's becoming disabled.
If the employee never suffered any misfortune which would entitle him or her
to benefits under the Plan, no payments would ever be made. The uncertainty
over whether the employee would ever receive any payments under the Plan
made them qualitatively different from payments due under a joint and survi-
vor annuity.
Receipt of payments due under a joint and survivor annuity is contingent
only upon the employee's survival. It is not contingent upon the employee's
sickness, accident, or other misfortune. The type of contingency ought to be
determinative. Focusing on the type of contingency is crucial because it will
result in treating as lifetime payments only payments which are qualitatively
similar to payments made under a joint and survivor annuity.
Payments due under a joint and survivor annuity are either payable to the
employee or the employee possesses the right to receive the payments. Further,
the payments are due during the employee's life or for a period which is not
ascertainable without reference to his death or which does not in fact end
before his death. Such payments therefore satisfy the requirements of section
2039.128 Payments under the Sickness and Accident Plan did not possess those
127. Rev. Rul. 77-183, 1977-1 C.B. 274.
,128. The Fusz court made it clear that the term "annuity or other payment"
should have the same meaning in both places in which it appears in § 2039(a). Fusz,
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charateristics. They were not payable for the employee's life because they
would cease if the condition which necessitated them ceased, even if the em-
ployee's life did not cease. 129 In addition, the payments under the Sickness and
Accident Plan were payable for a period which was ascertainable without ref-
erence to the employee's death and which might end before his death. 30 The
length of the affliction, not the employee's life, would determine entitlement to
the payments. Unlike the joint and survivor annuity payments which served as
the model for section 2039 and whose characteristics are reflected in the re-
quirements of that section, amounts payable under the Sickness and Accident
Plan were uncertain. Therefore, amounts payable under the Sickness and Ac-
cident Plan should not have fulfilled the lifetime payment requirement. The
Service was correct in its conclusion that the amounts payable under the Sick-
ness and Accident Plan described in Rev. Rul. 77-183 were not "other pay-
ments" for purposes of the lifetime payment requirement. Only its analysis
was unsound.
A sounder understanding of the genesis of the lifetime payment require-
ment would have led to the formulation of a test that would have been more
consistent with Congressional intent than the Service's "compensatory" formu-
lation. Qualitative similarity is such a test. It requires that in order to satisfy
the lifetime payment requirement an amount must be qualitatively similar to
amounts paid under a joint and survivor annuity. To satisfy the test, payment
of the amount must follow the voluntary or chronological termination of em-
ployment and be contingent only upon survival, not upon the occurrence of
sickness, accident or other disability. The formulation and application of such
a test for determining the existence of a lifetime payment would have pre-
vented the misapplication of the aggregation rule.
46 T.C. at 217. Indeed, one of the reasons the Tax Court objected to the Service's
argument that salary was an "other payment" for purposes of the third requirement
was that it would require construing the term differently in each of the places in which
it appears in § 2039(a). (Although the term actually appears three times in § 2039(a),
at the end of the section the term is only used to refer back, i.e. the section speaks of
"such annuity or other payment." The term has no independent significance in that
clause.)
The term first appears in the opening clause of § 2039(a). That clause includes in
a decedent's gross estate the value of an "annuity or other payment" payable to a
survivor. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1986). The issue of whether payments to a survivor are
post-employment payments will not arise because, by hypothesis, any payments made
to an employee's survivors will be made after the employee terminates his or her em-
ployment. The issue will only arise in connection with the interpretation of the term in
the second place it appears - in the statement of the lifetime payment requirement.
Under that requirement an "annuity or other payment" must have been payable to the
lecedent during his or her lifetime. I.R.C. § 2039(a),(1986).
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2. Scope of the Aggregation Rule
The failure to look to congressional intent and to the model of the joint
and survivor annuity led the Service astray in formulating a test for determin-
ing whether an amount was an "other payment" for purposes of the lifetime
payment requirement. The same failure led both the Service and the Claims
Court astray in applying the aggregation rule.131
In the leading case on the aggregation rule, Estate of Bahen v. United
States,1 32 the Service took the position that an employee's right to receive pay-
ments under his employer's non-qualified Deferred Compensation Plan satis-
fied the lifetime payment requirement even though the employee had to be-
come totally disabled in order to receive any payments at all under the plan. 33
The Claims Court agreed and held for the Service.134 Instead of examining
whether the payments in question shared the salient characteristics of pay-
ments due under a joint and survivor annuity, the court merely concluded that
the existence of a contingency would not prevent an amount from being an
"other payment" and satisfying the lifetime payment requirement. 35 Such a
summary conclusion misses the point.
It is not the existence of a contingency that is determinative, but rather
the type of contingency that is important. As acknowledged above, payments
due an employee under a joint and survivor annuity are generally contingent,
at minimum, upon the employee's survival until retirement. Such a contin-
131. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
132. 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit
in Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979), said of the court's
opinion in Bahen that it was "a virtuoso performance which has tended to dominate the
field to the extent that ... courts seem to look to the Bahen opinion rather than to the
statute and the committee reports as indicative of the legislative intent." Schelberg,
612 F.2d at 32.
133. The Deferred Compensation Plan provided for payments to an employee's
survivors in sixty equal installments. Bahen, 305 F.2d at 828. Only if the employee
became totally incapacitated would the payments be made to him, with any unpaid
installments going to his widow or minor children. Id. Following Mr. Bahen's death, his
employer made the required payments to his widow as provided by the Plan. Id. In
addition to the benefits provided by the Deferred Compensation Plan, Mr. Bahen was
also entitled to benefits under his employer's Death Benefit Plan. That latter plan pro-
vided that his survivors would receive an amount equal to three months' salary. Id. The
Service sought to include the benefits paid to Mrs. Bahen under both plans in Mr.
Bahen's gross estate. It took the position that Mr. Bahen's right to receive payments
under the Deferred Compensation Plan in the case of complete disability fulfilled the
lifetime payment requirement, so that the payments made to Mrs. Bahen under that
plan met all three requirements of § 2039(a). Id. at 831-32. It then took the further
position that the Deferred Compensation and Death Benefit Plans should be aggregated
for purposes of § 2039 so that Mr. Bahen's right to lifetime payments under the former
plan could fulfill the lifetime payment requirement under the latter. Id. at 835.
134. Bahen, 305 F.2d at 831.
135. Id. The court relied on Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) which states that
amounts that constitute an "other payment" can be "equal or unequal, conditional or
unconditional, periodic or sporadic." Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) (1979).
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gency is fundamentally different from a contingency upon sickness, accident or
disability, none of which may ever occur. Had the Bahen court focused on the
nature of the contingency involved, it would have concluded that the payments
in question did not satisfy the lifetime payment requirement because they were
qualitatively different from the type of payments due under a joint and survi-
vor annuity. Such a conclusion would have eliminated the need to reach the
issue of the applicability of the aggregation rule.
Regrettably, the Bahen court missed the opportunity to clarify the scope
of the lifetime payment requirement and, in doing so, was primarily responsi-
ble for bringing the law on section 2039 to its present confused state. The
court first concluded that the payments which Mr. Bahen would receive if he
became disabled satisfied the lifetime payment requirement. Thus, the court
next had to address a plan which provided payments to his widow.130 If the
two plans could be aggregated and treated as one for purposes of section 2039,
the value of the payments due Mrs. Bahen under the second plan would be
included in Mr. Bahen's gross estate under that section. If the two plans could
not be treated as one, the amounts due under the second plan would escape
inclusion in Mr. Bahen's gross estate because they would fail to meet the life-
time payment requirement. 13 7
The Bahen court concluded that the two plans should be aggregated. It
did so even after acknowledging that there was "no suggestion" that the two
plans were established in an attempt to effect the type of annuity splitting
which the aggregation rule was designed to prevent.13 8 Instead of formulating
the aggregation rule in a way that would accomplish its objective, the Bahen
court interpreted Example 6 of Treas. Reg. §20.2039-1(b)(2) to require aggre-
gation of all plans in all cases.139 The only exception the court recognized was
for qualified plans. The court was willing to except qualified plans from the
aggregation rule because section 2039(c) explicitly excluded such plans from
the gross estate. 40
The aggregation rule, as formulated by the Bahen court, is easy to apply.
Full aggregation requires little thought and no analysis. It simply happens.
However, it does not effectuate congressional intent. It includes in the gross
estate amounts which Congress could have but did not include under section
2039. If pure death benefits are to become subject to federal estate taxation, it
136. Having concluded that the Deferred Compensation plan provided for life-
time payments to Mr. Bahen, it was easy for the court to conclude that the value of
Mrs. Bahen's right to receive payments under that plan as a result of Mr. Bahen's
death was includible in Mr. Bahen's gross estate pursuant to § 2039.
137. Failure to meet the lifetime payment requirement would result in non-inclu-
sion under § 2039. As previously explained, it is unlikely that the Service would have
succeeded in including the value of Mrs. Bahen's payments under any other provision
even though the existence of § 2039 does not preclude such an attempt. Treas. Reg. §
20.2039-1(a) (1979); see supra note 84.
138. Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827, 835 n.16 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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should only be after thorough study of the reasons for doing so.14
Full aggregation as mandated by Bahen would also result in the aggrega-
tion of qualified and non-qualified plans now that section 2039(c) no longer
excludes the proceeds of qualified plans from the gross estate. That would be a
travesty. The aggregation rule is a legitimate response to a potential problem.
It prevents taxpayers from avoiding section 2039 by resorting to formalistic
distinctions. Applying the rule to situations that have no potential for avoid-
ance extends it beyond the bounds contemplated by the Treasury and nullifies
one of the requirements of section 2039.
Full aggregation, as the Bahen court requires, nullifies the contract re-
quirement. It is well established that a payment need not be made under a
written, bilateral agreement to satisfy the contract requirement.142 Any plan
unilaterally adopted by the employer will fulfill the contract requirement pro-
vided it has been communicated to the employee.1 48 Thus, any incident of the
employment relationship known to the employee fulfills the requirement. Full
aggregation means that all such incidents will comprise one contract or agree-
ment. The contract requirement would thus be a nullity in all cases where an
employment relationship exists. The employment relationship itself would suf-
fice to fulfill the contract requirement.
Surely, if Congress had wished to devise a system under which the whole
of the employment relationship constituted a contract for purposes of section
2039, it would have done so. At a minimum, it would not have required the
existence of a relationship between the payments due the surviving beneficiary
and the lifetime payments due the employee. But the statute clearly requires
that such a relationship exist. Section 2039(a) requires that the contract or
agreement which provides the survivor benefits also provide the lifetime pay-
ments to the employee.1 44 Congress would not have needed to require this rela-
tionship if it intended that the whole of the employment relationship would
always constitute the contract or agreement.
Congress specified the need for a relationship between the benefits paya-
ble to the survivor and the lifetime benefits payable to the employee because it
sought to tax joint and survivor annuities and qualitatively similar arrange-
ments. 45 The Bahen court's use of full aggregation is not grounded in the
purpose for the aggregation rule and serves to broaden the scope of section
2039 to the point where it could be used to include in an employee's gross
estate the value of any survivor's benefits provided by his or her employer.
141. See supra note 44.
142. See supra note 41.
143. See supra note 42.
144. Section 2039(a) provides that a survivor's annuity or other payment will be
included in an individual's gross estate if the annuity was payable "under any contract
or agreement ... if under such contract or agreement ... [the individual was entitled
to lifetime payments]." I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1986) (emphasis added). For the full text of
§ 2039(a), see supra note 19.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 23-39.
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Like the Fusz court, which analyzed the purpose of the lifetime payment re-
quirement and formulated a test that would achieve that purpose, the Bahen
court should have examined the purpose of the aggregation rule and formu-
lated a test which would achieve that purpose. It should not have merged the
issue of fulfillment of the lifetime payment requirement with the issue of
aggregation.
Only one court has come close to drawing a conceptual distinction be-
tween fulfillment of the lifetime payment requirement and application of the
aggregation rule. In Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner,1" the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit refused to aggregate benefits payable to an em-
ployee under a Total and Permanent Disability Plan (the "Disability Plan")
with an annuity paid to the employee's widow under a Group Life Insurance
Plan. " " The Group Life Insurance Plan provided only for payments to the
employee's survivors.148 Considered alone, payments made under that plan
would fall outside the scope of section 2039(a) because they would not meet
the lifetime payment requirement. The Service therefore tried to aggregate the
Group Life Insurance Plan with the Disability Plan. It took the position that
the employee's right to receive payments under the Disability Plan satisfied
the lifetime payment requirement.149 If the two plans were treated as one, then
all of the requirements of section 2039 would be satisfied and the payments to
the employee's widow would be included in his gross estate.
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, disagreed. He found that the Disa-
bility Plan could not be aggregated with the Group Life Insurance Plan so as
to cause the annuity paid under the latter to meet the lifetime payment re-
quirement of section 2039.150 To reach this conclusion, Judge Friendly first
analyzed the benefits payable to the employee under the Disability Plan. He
noted that the employee would receive benefits under that plan only if he be-
came disabled and remained so for more than 52 weeks. 151 He also noted that
146. 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979).
147. The employee's widow had also received a payment of group term life insur-
ance under the Plan but the case did not involve any issues with respect to that pay-
ment. Proceeds of the life insurance policy would have been included in the employee's
gross estate by § 2042, if at all. Section 2039 explicitly excludes from its coverage
payments of life insurance. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1986).
148. Schelberg, 612 F.2d at 27.
149. Id. at 29.
150. Id. at 31.
151. For the first 52 weeks of disability the employer's Sickness and Accident
Plan would provide benefits. The Service had not argued that the benefit due under the
Sickness and Accident Plan would fulfill the lifetime payment requirement because
that plan was virtually identical to the plan described in Rev. Rul. 77-183, 1977-1 C.B.
274. The only significant difference between the Sickness and Accident Plan discussed
in Rev. Rul. 77-183 and the Disability Plan at issue in Schelberg is that the Disability
Plan provided benefits after those due the employee under a Sickness and Accident
Plan were exhausted and would continue to provide the benefits until the employee
reached retirement age. As the court acknowledged, the Sickness and Accident Plan
described in the ruling was probably the same IBM plan that Mr. Schelberg partici-
[Vol. 53
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/7
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
this was a rather substantial contingency, which only one quarter of 1 percent
of all employees had been unfortunate enough to fulfill.152 Judge Friendly then
applied the Fusz qualitative similarity test. After looking to the legislative his-
tory of section 2039 he determined that the payments due the employee under
the Disability Plan were so unlike the joint and survivor annuity upon which
Congress modelled section 2039 that the amounts could not qualify as other
payments for purposes of that section.153
Schelberg could have provided the structure for a more sound analysis of
the lifetime payment requirement and the aggregation rule except for two
things. First, notwithstanding its use of the qualitative similarity test, the court
explicitly based its holding on other grounds. Thus, it echoed the Service's
notion that Fusz stood for the proposition that compensatory payments could
not satisfy the lifetime payment requirement.15 Second, the court did not ad-
dress separately the questions of aggregation and fulfillment of the lifetime
payment requirement.15 5 While such separate analysis did not affect the result
in that case given the court's conclusion that the Disability Plan benefits could
not fulfill the lifetime payment requirement, separate analysis would be mate-
rial in other situations. Any attempt to aggregate benefits payable under quali-
fied and non-qualified plans would present such a situation.
B. The Role of Qualified Plans: The Need For A Second Prong
The result in Schelberg might have been very different if the Service had
aggregated the benefits due under the employer's qualified pension plan with
those due under the Group Life Insurance Plan. Because the employee could
receive a pension during his lifetime and because a pension is qualitatively
similar to the joint and survivor annuity, the payments due the employee
under the qualified pension plan would have met the lifetime payment require-
ment. Taken together, the qualified pension and the Group Life Insurance
Plan would have met all three requirements of section 2039(a). Aggregating
the benefits provided by the qualified pension plan with the benefit provided by
the Group Life Insurance Plan would thus have resulted in inclusion of the
pated in. See infra note 158.
152. Schelberg, 612 F.2d at 33.
153. Id. at 31. Although Judge Friendly did not purport to apply a "qualitative
similarity" test, the analysis he employed was essentially like the analysis required to
apply the qualitative similarity test. Both involve an examination of the similarity be-
tween the payments in question and those due the primary annuitant under a typical
joint and survivor annuity. See Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 620
(1980).
154. Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1979).
155. Although the Schelberg court refused to accept the principle of full aggre-
gation, Id. at 31, its conclusion blurred the distinction between the question of whether
the Disability Plan benefits could satisfy the lifetime payment requirement and the
question of whether, if so, they should be aggregated with the Group Life Insurance
Plan benefits which Mr. Schelberg had received. Id. at 28.
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latter in the employee's gross estate.156
1. Administrative Interpretation of the Qualified Plan Exception to the
Aggregation Rule
The Service did not try to aggregate the benefits provided under the
Group Life Insurance Plan and the qualified pension plan in Schelberg. In-
stead, the Service followed the position it had set forth in Rev. Rul. 76-380.117
In that ruling the Service announced that it would not aggregate benefits pro-
vided by qualified plans with benefits provided by non-qualified plans.158
While refusing to aggregate benefits which enjoy a statutory exemption
from federal estate taxation with benefits which are not exempt has superficial
appeal,159 such reasoning does not withstand close scrutiny.1 60 First, neither
the benefits which are most clearly subject to aggregation, such as an em-
ployee's right to a single life annuity, nor the benefits which the Service has
succeeded in aggregating, such as Mr. Bahen's right to payments under his
employer's Disability Plan, were themselves subject to federal estate taxation.
If a benefit had to be subject to federal estate taxation to be subject to aggre-
gation, aggregation would rarely occur.1 61
156. See also Gray v. United States, 410 F.2d 1111, 1112 (3d Cir. 1969). In
Gray, the court aggregated two plans because the estate failed to suggest that one of
the plans was a qualified plan until the time of oral argument on appeal. The court
declined to consider the issue at that stage but implied that it would have reached a
different conclusion, refusing aggregation and preventing inclusion of the benefits in the
employee's gross estate, if the issue had been raised earlier.
157. Rev. Rul 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270.
158. Id. As the Schelberg court recognized, Rev. Rul. 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270
and Rev. Rul 77-183, 1977-1 C.B. 274 seem to have analyzed the plans at issue in that
case. Schelberg, 612 F.2d at 29 n.6. Although the identity of a taxpayer who requests a
ruling is confidential (I.R.C. § 6103), it is likely that the Schelberg court was correct
in its observation. Mr. Schelberg was employed by IBM. It is not unusual for large
companies whose benefit plans affect so many employees to seek rulings on the tax
consequences of their plans so that they can accurately advise their employees.
159. See supra text accompanying note 90.
160. Both courts and commentators have noted that the position expressed in
Rev. Rul. 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270 does not follow inexorably from the § 2039(c) ex-
clusion. See Estate of Schelberg v. United States, 612 F.2d 25, 29 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979);
Wolk, supra note 40, at 234 n.38. Neither has attempted to define what, if any, analyt-
ical justification might exist for it.
161. The benefits which the Service aggregates are often not the type of benefits
whose value would be included in the employee's gross estate. For example, the single
life annuity which the Treasury aggregates with the survivor's annuity in Treas. Reg. §
20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6 (1976) (see supra note 82) would not be included in the
employee's gross estate because it terminates upon the employee's death. I.R.C. § 2033
(1986). Similarly, the decedent's right to disability payments under his employer's De-
ferred Compensation Plan in Bahen, which the Service aggregated with payments
made to his widow under that plan as well as under the Death Benefit Plan (see supra
note 133), was not included in his gross estate. The .decedent's right to lifetime pay-
ments ceased upon his death and thus had no value which could pass to his survivors
40
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Second, section 2039(c) never provided a blanket exclusion for qualified
plan proceeds. Qualified plan distributions were always included in an em-
ployee's gross estate to the extent they were attributable to the employee's
contributions.162 They were also included in full if paid to the executor.1 6 3
Third, even if the existence of a statutory exemption for qualified plans
had been viewed as a Congressional directive to exclude such plans from con-
sideration for any purpose under the federal estate tax,'6 in 1976, the very
year Rev. Rul. 76-380 was issued, that directive was countermanded. In that
year Congress amended section 2039(c) to make the estate tax exclusion of
qualified plan proceeds contingent upon the waiver of favorable income tax
treatment. 6 5 After 1976 qualified plan proceeds could actually be included in
an employee's gross estate and probably were, at least in cases where the em-
ployee's estate did not exceed the amount exempted by the unified credit.,
and be subject to the estate tax. I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033 (1986); see Williams v. United
States, 41 F.2d 895, 897 (Ct. CL. 1930); Rev. Rul. 74-492, 1974-2 C.B. 298.
162. I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1984).
163. I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1984). Section 2039(c) only excluded from the em-
ployee's gross estate "the value of an annuity or other payment ... receivable by any
beneficiary (other than the executor).... ." Id. (emphasis added).
164. The argument would be that if exclusion from the gross estate was neces-
sary or desirable to make qualified plans more attractive, that attractiveness should not
be undermined by allowing qualified plans to be used to subject other benefits to fed-
eral estate taxation.
165. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 2009(c)(3), 90 Stat. 1895
(1976) [hereinafter "TRA 1976"] amended § 2039(c) to provide that annuities or
other payments would be included in a decedent's gross estate if the payments were
made in a lump sum. This 1976 amendment proceeded from a Congressional belief
that lump sum payments would normally generate sufficient cash to cover the estate tax
liability attributable to the inclusion of the benefits in the decedent's gross estate. H.R.
REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-71 (1976). The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, § 142(b), 92 Stat. 2796 (1978), as amended by the Technical Corrections
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 101(a)(8)(B), 94 Stat. 201 (1979), restored the
exclusion for lump sum distributions only where the recipient agreed irrevocably to
forego favorable income tax treatment, including ten-year averaging and capital gains
treatment, with respect to the distribution. Congress apparently wanted to restore the
favorable estate tax treatment of distributions from qualified plans but felt that
favorable income and estate tax treatment was too much. See H.R. REP. No. 1800,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 210 (1978); see also Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 86
T.C. 980 (1986) (lump sum distribution properly included in decedent's gross estate
where beneficiary-son reported the amount as capital gain); Nasuti, How to Coordinate
Income and Estate Tax Planning for Qualified Plan Distributions, 49 J. TAX'N 194
(1978).
166. The unified credit, which applied to estates of decedents who died after De-
cember 31, 1976, had the effect of exempting $120,666 of the taxable estate from
federal estate taxation. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2001 (1977). This amount has risen steadily
since then. See supra note 54. If an employee's taxable estate would not exceed the
applicable exemption equivalent even with the inclusion of the value of a lump sum
distribution from a qualified plan, the executor would have been well advised to urge
the appropriate beneficiary to take the lump sum distribution and thus enjoy the bene-
fits of ten-year averaging and possible capital gains treatment. I.R.C. § 2039(0(2)
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When it issued Rev. Rul. 76-380 the Service had to have known that the
1976 amendment to section 2039(c) would be enacted.167 Perhaps the Service
reasoned that as long as qualified plans were excluded from the gross estate
under some circumstances, excepting them from the aggregation rule served to
further the policy of preferential treatment for such plans. Such an exception
would also prevent the additional complexity which would have resulted from
any attempt to make aggregation contingent upon actual inclusion in a dece-
dent's gross estate.
The possibility of a relationship between the qualified plan exception from
the aggregation rule and the section 2039(c) exclusion from the gross estate
became even more difficult to sustain after 1982. In that year Congress lim-
ited the section 2039(c) exclusion to $100,000 regardless of whether the em-
ployee's beneficiaries elected favorable income tax treatment of the plan pro-
ceeds.168 The 1982 amendment signaled a change in the congressional view of
the section 2039(c) exclusion.'6 9 No longer would exclusion be the rule and
inclusion the exception. Now qualified plan proceeds would always be included
in an employee's gross estate to the extent they exceeded $100,000. If the
Service had excepted qualified plans from aggregation because of the estate
tax exclusion for the proceeds of such plans, the 1982 change in the exclusion
should have caused the Service to question whether it ought to change its pol-
icy of non-aggregation.
If the Service did question its policy after 1982, it did so in silence. If it
questioned its policy following the 1984 repeal of the section 2039(c) exclusion
it also did so in silence. The Service has not modified or amended Rev. Rul.
76-380 since it was issued; the ruling therefore continues to stand as a state-
ment of the Service's position on the aggregation rule.27 0 The time is ripe for a
re-examination of that position.' 7'
(1984); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 980 (1986); see Nasuti, supra
note 165.
167. H.R. 10612 was passed by the House on December 4, 1975. Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), was passed by the House and the Senate on September
16, 1976. It was signed by the President on October 4, 1976. That was the day on
which the Service issued Rev. Rul. 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270. Since the amendment to §
2039(c) had been introduced in the House and was a part of the bill when that cham-
ber passed it in 1975, the Service therefore had to have known that § 2039(c) would
soon cease to provide a complete exclusion for qualified plans when it ruled that such
plans would not be subject to aggregation.
168. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
170. While revenue rulings do not have the force and effect of Treasury Depart-
ment Regulations, they may be used as precedent. See Rev. Proc. 86-15, 1986-1 C.B.
544, 545.
171. If the Service needed a further indication of the disfavor with which Con-
gress viewed the grant of special estate tax treatment of qualified plan proceeds, the
1986 TRA certainly provided it. Section 4981A, which was added to the Code by §
1133 of that legislation, provides for a 15 percent increase in the estate tax payable by
the estate of any individual who has an "excess retirement accumulation." I.R.C. §
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2. As It Should Be: Use of a Two-Pronged Test
a. The Second Prong
The aggregation rule was developed to prevent avoidance of section 2039
by individuals who split a joint and survivor annuity into two single life annui-
ties, neither of which would satisfy all of the requirements of section 2039.72
As previously explained, the first inquiry should be whether the plan sought to
be aggregated meets the lifetime payment requirement. That determination
should be made by using the qualitative similarity test of Fusz.17 3 If a pay-
ment is qualitatively similar to that provided under a joint and survivor annu-
ity it will fulfill the lifetime payment requirement. That, however, is only the
first prong of the test for aggregation.
A second inquiry is necessary. That second inquiry should determine
whether the plan in question can be used to effect the annuity splitting which
the aggregation rule seeks to prevent. Only plans which present the opportu-
nity for the abuse that the aggregation rule seeks to prevent should be subject
to aggregation.
This second inquiry is, in effect, the second prong of the test for aggrega-
tion. It will give the aggregation rule a scope consistent with its purpose. Lim-
iting aggregation to benefits which present the opportunity for annuity split-
ting ensures that annuity splitting will not result in the avoidance of section
2039.174 The aggregation rule will have served its purpose. Equally important,
it will have done so without enlarging the scope of section 2039 beyond the
bounds that Congress contemplated when enacting and amending that section.
b. Operation of the Proposed Test
The operation of this proposed two-pronged test can be illustrated by us-
ing it to determine whether benefits provided under qualified plans should be
aggregated with benefits provided under non-qualified plans for purposes of
section 2039. Benefits provided under qualified plans easily satisfy the first
prong of the test. Payment of the benefits is contingent only upon survival to
retirement age or age 70- .17 5 Thus, the employee is entitled to receive the
4891A(d) (1986). Most distressingly, the unified credit cannot be used against that
increase in the estate tax. I.R.C. § 4891A(d)(2) (1986).
172. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) example 6 (1976); see supra note 82 and ac-
companying text.
173. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
174. That the second prong of the test requires a case by case determination does
not make it undesirable. While bright line tests are easy to administer, they lack flexi-
bility and can thus lead to unfair results. The test proposed here is tailored to the
purpose of the rule and will ensure that the rule will accomplish it. The proposed test
should not be difficult to administer because it should not be difficult to determine
whether an individual can use a particular benefit to effect annuity splitting.
175. Section 401(a) requires that payment of benefits begin by April 1 of the
calendar year following the latter of the year of retirement (I.R.C. § 402(a)(9)(C)(ii)
(1986)) or the year the employee attains age 70- (I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i) (1986)).
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benefits during his lifetime. Benefits due under qualified plans are therefore
post-employment benefits qualitatively similar to those provided by a joint and
survivor annuity.176 Indeed, the statute favors payment of such benefits in the
form of a joint and survivor annuity. 177 The lifetime payments to which a par-
ticipant in a qualified plan is entitled clearly fulfill the lifetime payment re-
quirement of section 2039(a).
Nevertheless, benefits provided under qualified plans should not be aggre-
gated with benefits provided under non-qualified plans because they do not
pass the second prong of the test. Qualified plans do not present the opportu-
nity for the annuity splitting which the aggregation rule seeks to prevent.
Qualified plans are so heavily regulated that they do not present any opportu-
nity for annuity splitting at all.
Qualified plans are self-contained, independent entities. Plan assets are
held by a trust, not by the employer.178 Benefits provided to participants ema-
nate only from the assets contributed to and generated by the trust.179 The
level of benefits is determined by the trust and cannot discriminate in favor of
officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees. 180 With one exception,
factors outside the trust cannot affect the level or form of benefits.18 ' The
exception proves the rule.
The exception is the social security system. 82 Benefits provided by quali-
fied plans can be integrated with social security. 83 Plans which are so inte-
grated provide comparatively fewer benefits to employees covered by social
See Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-(l)-(2).
176. Even if the employee had elected to receive benefits in a lump sum, the plan
would fulfill the lifetime payment requirement because the lump sum would be an
"other payment" which would satisfy the lifetime payment requirement. For an excel-
lent discussion of the treatment of distributions from qualified plans, see Hoyt, Taxa-
tion of Qualified Plan Distributions: History and Analysis, 5 VA. TAX. REv. 287
(1985).
177. I.R.C. § 417 (1986). Section 417 even requires certain married participants
to obtain the written consent of their spouse before they can receive benefits in any
form other than a qualified joint and survivor annuity. I.R.C. § 417(a) (1986). Indeed,
since 1976, § 401(a)(11) required plans to offer payment in the form of a qualifiedjoint and survivor annuity. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1021(a)(1), 88 Stat. 935 (1974).
Congress added § 417 in 1984 to remedy the inequities which resulted when a partici-
pant elected to receive a single life annuity but died prematurely, potentially leaving a
spouse unprotected. Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 203, 98 Stat. 1426, 1441-45 (1984); S. REP.
No. 98-575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984).
178. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3) (1971); Treas. Reg. §
1.401-2(a) (1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-2 (1971).
179. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3)(v) and (vi) (1971);
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4 (1971).
180. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3)(v) and (vi) (1971);
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4 (1971).
181. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e)(1).
182. See supra note 181.
183. Id. The regulations prescribe the method of integration, however. Treas.
Reg. § 1.401-3(e)(2) (1971).
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security than to employees not covered by social security.' In effect, benefits
are split between the plan and the social security system. The need for special
statutory authority to allow such benefit splitting185 and the need for several
pages of regulations to govern its operation"8' show that qualified plans could
not be used for any other type of benefit splitting.
Yet, benefit splitting is precisely what the aggregation rule was designed
to prevent. Since the statutory and regulatory provisions which govern quali-
fied plans already prevent it, application of the aggregation rule would be
superfluous.
Congress has regulated qualified plans extensively. Every detail of such a
plan, from who must participate, 1 the maximum benefits they can receive,188
the minimum benefits they must receive, 18' and the time when their benefits
must become vested190 to when and in what form they will receive the bene-
fits,191 is the subject of an intricate web of statutory and regulatory provisions.
Always concerned that taxpayers not abuse the significant tax advantages of-
fered by qualified plans, Congress has often fine-tuned the statute and further
restricted an employer's freedom to set the terms of its qualified plans. 192 The
184. Integrated plans may even exclude from coverage employees whose remu-
neration does not exceed the social security wage base (I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1) (1986);
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e)(1)) or provide different contributions or benefits with respect
to remuneration included in the social security wage base. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e)(1)
(1971).
185. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (1986). Absent statutory dispensation, an integrated
plan would fail the minimum coverage (I.R.C. § 401 (1986)) and non-discrimination
requirements (I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1986)) because lower rank employees, whose com-
pensation would be subject to social security, would either not be covered by the plan
or be covered to a lesser degree than more highly compensated employees.
186. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e).
187. I.R.C. § 410 (1986).
188. I.R.C. § 415(b) (1986).
189. I.R.C. § 412 (1986).
190. I.R.C. § 411 (1986).
191. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9), (a)(11), 417 (1986).
192. Including technical corrections, § 401(a) alone has undergone more than 45
amendments over the past ten years. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1106(d)(1), 1111(b),
1112(b), 1114(b)(7), 1119(a), 1121(b), 1136(a), 1145(a), 1171(b)(5), 1174(c)(2)(A),
1175(a)(1), 1176(a), 1852(a)(4)(A), 1852(a)(6), 1852(b)(8), 1898(b)(2)(A)(i)(ii),
1898(b)(7)(A), 1898(b)(13)(A), 1898(B)(14)(A), 1899(A)(10), 100 Stat. 2423, 2435,
2444, 2451, 2463, 2465, 2485, 2490, 2513, 2518, 1519, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2945, 2948,
2950, 2958 (1986); Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 203(a), 204(a), 301(b), 98 Stat. 1440,
1441, 1445 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 211(b)(5), 474(r)(13), 491(e)(4) and (5),
521(a)(1) and (2), 524(d)(1), 98 Stat. 754, 842, 853, 865, 867, 872 (1984); Pub. L.
No. 97-448, § 103(g)(2)(A), 96 Stat. 2379 (1983); Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 237(b),
237(e)(1), 240(b), 242(a), 254(a), 96 Stat. 511, 512, 520, 521, 533 (1982); Pub. L.
No. 97-34, §§ 312(b)(1), 335, 338(a), 95 Stat. 283, 297, 298 (1981); Pub. L. No. 96-
605, §§ 221(a), 225(b)(1), 94 Stat. 3528, 3529 (1980); Pub. L. No. 96-364, §§ 208(a),
208(e), 410(b), 94 Stat. 1289, 1290, 1308 (1980); Pub. L. No. 96-222, §§
101(a)(7)(L)(i)(V), 101(a)(9), 101(a)(14)(E)(iii), 94 Stat. 199, 201, 205 (1980); Pub.
L. No. 95-600, § 141(f)(3), 143(a), 152(e), 92 Stat. 2795, 2796, 2799 (1978); Pub. L.
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result of such extensive legislative scrutiny is a complex set of rules that pro-
hibit both employers and employees from using a qualified plan to do practi-
cally anything but what it is supposed to do.
In 1984 Congress even amended the qualified plan provisions to require
that benefits due many married participants be paid in the form of a joint and
survivor annuity. 193 Only if the participant's spouse waives his or her right to
receive such an annuity or cannot be located can the plan pay the benefits in
any other form. 9 4 In such a case the benefits are paid in accordance with the
terms of the plan.195 Realistically, the options will be either a lump sum distri-
bution or some other type of annuity, either single life or joint. 96
If a spouse does not waive the right to receive a survivor annuity, the
value of the annuity will be included in the employee's gross estate under sec-
tion 2039.197 If a spouse waives the right to the survivor annuity or if the
employee is unmarried, the employee may receive the benefits in a lump sum.
Whatever amount remains unconsumed at the employee's death will then be
included in his or her gross estate. 98 If such an employee elects a single life
annuity, whatever remains unconsumed at his or her death will be included in
his or her gross estate.199 Because nothing will pass to the survivors nothing
No. 94-455, 803(b)(2), 90 Stat. 1584 (1976).
193. See supra note 36. In the case of a married plan participant who dies before
he or she begins to receive an annuity, (the "annuity starting date," I.R.C. § 417(0(2)
(1986)), § 401(a)(1 1) requires that the surviving spouse receive a qualified preretire-
ment survivor annuity. I.R.C. § 401(a)(l1)(A)(ii) (1986). Section 417(c) defines a
qualified preretirement survivor annuity generally as an annuity which is essentially
equivalent to the survivor annuity which the surviving spouse would have received if the
deceased spouse had retired with a qualified joint and survivor annuity the day before
the date of death or, if the participant could not have retired prior to the date of death,
an annuity which is equivalent to the survivor annuity the surviving spouse would have
received if the participant had died the day after the earliest possible retirement date
provided in the plan. I.R.C. § 417(c)(1) (1986); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)-
1T(c)(1).
194. I.R.C. § 417(a)(2) (1986). This provision generally applies only to partici-
pants who have been married at least one year. I.R.C. § 417(d) (1986). The statute
provides detailed rules setting forth the period during which the election can be made
(I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(5) (1984)) as well as the information which must be
provided to a participant with respect to such an election (I.R.C. § 417(a)(3)(A)
(1986)), and the periods during which a participant may revoke any such election.
I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(5) (1986).
195. The Code does not otherwise limit the form in which benefits can be paid,
although it does mandate when payment must be made. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (1986); see
infra note 200.
196. The only alternative to payment in a lump sum or payment in some form of
annuity is forfeiture, an economically unsound and therefore unrealistic alternative.
197. A qualified plan meets all of the requirements of § 2039(a). Given the re-
peal of § 2039(c), the value of the survivor annuity would be included in the em-
ployee's gross estate because no other provision would exclude it. See supra note 193.
198. Any amounts not consumed but gratuitously transferred during the em-
ployee's life will be subject to the gift tax. I.R.C. § 2501 (1986).
199. I.R.C. § 2033 (1986).
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else need be included on account of the plan. If the plan provides for some
other type of joint and survivor annuity, the value of the survivor annuity will
be included in the employee's gross estate under section 2039. The benefits
provided by the qualified plan will therefore be subject to the estate tax to the
extent that they pass to the employee's survivors either through non-consump-
tion during the employee's life or through the payment of a survivor
annuity.200
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the qualified plan provisions
themselves ensure that any benefits attributable to contributions made to such
plans will be included in the employee's gross estate unless consumed during
the employee's lifetime. The benefits cannot be split.20 ' They cannot be used to
avoid section 2039. They fail the second prong of the test.
Because payments due under qualified plans fail the second prong of the
test they should not be aggregated with other benefits for purposes of section
2039. To do otherwise would be to use the aggregation rule to prevent an
occurrence which the qualified plan provisions have been meticulously drafted
to prevent. It would be superfluous and inappropriate.
3. Non-Aggregation: The Right Result for Qualified Plans
a. Effectuating Congressional Intent
The proposed two-pronged test yields the right result in the case of quali-
fied plans. Applying the aggregation rule to qualified plans would give the
government a windfall not contemplated by Congress. The repeal of section
2039(c) would then result not only in subjecting qualified plan proceeds to
federal estate taxation, which Congress clearly intended, but also subjecting to
estate taxation many non-qualified death benefits paid to survivors. 20 2 There is
200. I.R.C. § 2039 (1986). Benefits payable under a qualified plan will be in-
cluded in the gross estate even if the employee elects to have benefits payable in the
form of a single survivor annuity. In such a case all of the requirements of § 2039(a)
will be satisfied. The amount will clearly be an annuity paid under a contract or agree-
ment (the plan). The plan itself will also satisfy the lifetime payment requirement be-
cause of § 401(a)(9). That section requires that a qualified plan distribute an em-
ployee's interest to him or her by the later of the year after retirement or the year he or
she turns 70-1/. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(A), (c) (1986); see Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-(1),
52 Fed. Reg. 28075 (1987) and (2), 52 Fed. Reg. 28098 (1987). The plan itself will
therefore provide for payments to the employee during his or her lifetime. Since such
payments depend only upon the employee's survival until a particular date, they clearly
satisfy the lifetime payment requirement. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
201. Use of qualified plan contributions to provide a pure death benefit outside
the plan would violate § 401(a)(1) and disqualify the plan.
202. For example, aggregation of qualified and non-qualified plans would have
resulted in federal estate taxation of the benefits payable to Mrs. Schelberg. See supra
note 155 and accompanying text. Assuming that the benefit package offered by Mr.
Schelberg's employer, International Business Machines (IBM) is not atypical, aggrega-
tion of qualified plans would provide a simple way for the Service to succeed in taxing
benefits payable to survivors of many employees of corporate America.
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no indication that Congress even considered, much less intended, such a result.
Indeed, the legislative history suggests that Congress did not believe that the
repeal of section 2039(c) would have very far reaching consequences at all.203
The test proposed would ensure a result consistent with the congressional
intent in repealing section 2039(c) as well as in enacting section 2039. If Con-
gress had wanted to tax pure death benefits, it would have done so directly.
That the requirements for inclusion in the gross estate under section 2039 so
meticulously reflect the characteristics of a joint and survivor annuity shows
that such annuities are all Congress intended to tax with the provision. If Con-
gress had wanted to tax pure death benefits it could easily have done so by
simply eliminating the lifetime payment requirement. 2"4 Congress did not in-
tend to use section 2039 to tax pure death benefits.205 The repeal of the quali-
fied plan exclusion should not be used to accomplish that result.
b. Consistency with Prior Administrative Practice
Not aggregating qualified and non-qualified benefits would also be consis-
tent with the Service's prior practice. The Service's response to previous
203. In their discussion of the consequences of the repeal of the qualified plan
exclusion both the Senate Finance Committee and the Joint Committee on Taxation
noted that qualified plan benefits would be eligible for the unlimited marital deduction
if included in the gross estate and would therefore generate no actual estate tax liabil-
ity if left to a surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056 (1986); see 1984 Blue Book, supra note
69, at 824; supra note 73. In addition, those committees noted that to the extent that
qualified plan benefits generated any estate tax liability such liability could be offset by
the unified credit. I.R.C. § 2010 (1986); see 1984 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 824;
supra note 75. Although this does not mean that benefits paid under qualified plans
would never generate any actual estate tax liability, it does show that Congress did not
perceive the inclusion of such proceeds in the gross estate as a change that would have
far reaching implications for the estate taxation of employee benefits. There is no sug-
gestion in the legislative history that Congress even considered that the repeal of
§ 2039(c) might lead to the inclusion in the gross estate of not only qualified plan
benefits but non-qualified pure death benefits as well.
Indeed, Congress did not even expect to raise comparatively large amounts of reve-
nue through the repeal of § 2039(c). The measure was expected to raise $50 million in
each of the three years following its enactment. 1984 Blue Book, supra note 69, at 825.
That amount is paltry when compared to that raised by other provisions of the 1984
legislation. Freezing tax reforms alone was expected to raise $10,546 million in 1985,
$18,071 million in 1986 and $24,123 million in 1987. 1984 Blue Book, supra note 69,
at 1235.
204. Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that Congress should elimi-
nate the lifetime payment requirement so as to allow § 2039 to reach pure death bene-
fits. Colliton, Conforming Section 2039 to the Goals of Estate Taxation, 34 U. FLA. L.
REv. 693, 711-12 (1982); see also Wolk, supra note 40.
205. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1982 (TEFRA) amendment which
restricted the § 2039(c) exemption to $100,000 or in the 1984 TRA provisions which
repealed the exemption altogether suggests that Congress, Treasury, or even the Ser-
vice itself saw the repeal of the § 2039(c) exemption as a way to subject otherwise
nontaxable survivors benefits to the federal estate tax. See supra note 204.
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changes to the section 2039(c) exclusion would not have suggested that the
complete repeal of that exclusion could have such far reaching consequences.
When Congress amended section 2039(c) in 1976 to limit the qualified plan
exclusion to situations where the beneficiary did not elect favorable income tax
treatment, 20 8 the response of the Treasury and the Service did not suggest that
benefits provided by qualified plans would be subject to aggregation when the
proceeds were included in the employee's gross estate because the beneficiary
elected favorable income tax treatment. On the contrary, in 1976 the Service
issued Rev. Rul. 76-380, which confirmed that the aggregation rule did not
apply to benefits paid by qualified plans.207 If non-aggregation depended on
exclusion from the gross estate, it would have followed that when the exclusion
did not apply, the aggregation rule would. Yet, in no reported case or ruling
has the Service asserted such a position.20 8
Furthermore, when Congress in 1982 reduced the section 2039(c) exclu-
sion to $100,000,209 the Service did not similarly reduce the scope of the ex-
ception from the aggregation rule. Thus, although qualified plan proceeds in
excess of $100,000 were no longer excluded from the gross estate under any
circumstances, the Service did not announce any change in its position regard-
ing the treatment of benefits provided by qualified plans for purposes of the
aggregation rule.
The Service's silence on this point notwithstanding statutory revisions that
suggested changes in the Service's position on the aggregation rule 10 would
have reinforced Congress' assumption that the complete repeal of the section
2039(c) exclusion would have no collateral effects. It might even suggest that
the Service has come to recognize the existence of another justification for
expecting qualified plans from aggregation. Formal adoption of the suggested
two-pronged test would provide that justification. It would also bring much
needed clarity to a complicated and confusing area of the law.
V. SUGGESTED ACTION
A. Amendment of Existing Regulations and Rulings
The tremendous popularity of qualified plans makes it imperative that the
Treasury and the Service set forth a comprehensive analysis of the effect of
the repeal of section 2039(c) on the estate taxation of employee death bene-
206. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
208. Although the absence of a reported case does not mean that the Service has
never asserted such a position, it does show that the Service has not asserted the posi-
tion with sufficient regularity to result in litigation. The absence of a ruling is even
more telling, since the Service could have used the issuance of a ruling to indicate a
change in its position without having to litigate a case.
209. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 67.
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fits."' Doing so will require an examination of section 2039 and the aggrega-
tion rule. Such an examination should proceed along the lines presented here
and should conclude with the adoption of the proposed two-pronged test. The
Treasury should then set forth the test in the regulations and the Service
should amend its rulings accordingly.212
Amendment of the existing regulations and rulings would serve several
desirable ends. It would prevent the unexpected taxation of pure death benefits
not currently subject to such taxation. It would clarify a confusing area of the
law. It would also provide a mechanism for determining whether certain other
plans should escape aggregation. 13
B. Extension Beyond Qualified Plans
The two-pronged test suggested here should be applied before any pay-
ments are aggregated for purposes of section 2039. In many cases, particularly
those involving non-qualified plans, payments which satisfy the first prong of
the test will also satisfy the second prong. Non-qualified plans reflect only a
contractual relationship between the employer and employee.2 1 4 The parties
211. In the first six months of 1987 alone, the Service issued 42,713 determina-
tion letters on initial applications for qualified plans benefitting approximately
13,096,317 employees. I.R.S. News Release IR-87-97 (August 19, 1987).
In addition, an independent survey of 256 major employers conducted between
1981 and 1986 found that over 95 percent of these employers offered defined benefit
plans. The survey included 75 percent of Fortune 100 and 68 percent of Fortune 250
companies, as well as 38 percent of Fortune 50 commercial banking companies and 46
percent of Fortune 50 life insurance companies. Pens. & Benefits Daily (BNA) (July
10, 1987).
212. At minimum, Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) example 6, should be
amended. The amendment should delete the parenthetical reference to § 401(a) plans
and to Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2, which is obsolete in light of the repeal of § 2039(c).
Treasury should then add another example illustrating the application of the aggrega-
tion rule as proposed here. The example should involve a qualified plan and a pure
death benefit and should set forth the analysis which leads to the conclusion that aggre-
gation is not appropriate. In addition, the Service should issue another ruling clarifying
Rev. Rul. 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270 so as to make explicit the limitations on the aggre-
gation rule and the role of qualified plans.
213. Defining the scope of an aggregation rule would not be a novel endeavor for
Treasury. The qualified plan area contains aggregation rules which Treasury has metic-
ulously delineated in its regulations. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.415-10 (1986).
214. Non-qualified deferred compensation plans need only to be structured so as
to avoid current inclusion of the deferred amounts in the employee's income. Thus, they
cannot result in constructive receipt by the employee (Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1986),
Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698) or bestow an
economic benefit on the employee. Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 247 (1951),
aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 C.B. 127, 128;
Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193, 194; see McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Con-
ceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAX L. REV. 201, 204 (1969); Metzer, Constructive Receipt,
Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in Deferred Compensa-
tion, 29 TAx. L. REV. 525, 551 (1974); see also Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985) and cases cited therein. Non-qualified deferred compensation
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determine the details of that relationship without interference from Congress.
Therefore, many non-qualified plans might well present an opportunity for the
kind of annuity-splitting which the aggregation rule sought to prevent. Pay-
ments made under such plans would generally fail the second prong of the test
and would be subject to aggregation.
Not all plans which are not qualified plans would fail the second prong of
the test, however. In addition to the section 401(a) qualified plans which the
Treasury specifically referred to in Treas. Reg. §20.2039-1, Example 6, and
which have been the focus of discussion here, Congress has legislated the re-
quirements for other types of income tax favored employee benefit plans.
215
For example, benefits provided by section 403(a) plans are subject to the same
non-discrimination, vesting and minimum funding requirements as section
401(a) qualified plans.2 16 Like section 401(a) qualified plans, section 403(a)
plans must provide a joint and survivor annuity for married participants unless
the participant's spouse waives the right to the annuity.2 11 Like payments
made under section 401(a) qualified plans, payments made under section
403(a) plans would fail the second prong of the test and should not be subject
to aggregation.
Section 403(b) annuity plans are also subject to detailed statutory pro-
scriptions.218 They are subject to virtually the same restrictions as are section
arrangements can contain any provisions negotiated by employer and employee so long
as they avoid the application of those two general doctrines. While the doctrines gener-
ally require that the employer's promise be unfunded and that the employee's interest
not exceed that of a general creditor (see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-75, 1972-1 C.B. 127; Rev.
Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193), they do not mandate the form or timing of the
distributions.
215. Section 2039(c), prior to amendment by DEFRA, also excluded from a de-
cedent's gross estate (1) the value of a retirement annuity contract purchased by an
employer under a section 403(a) plan, (I.R.C. § 2039(c)(2) (1984)), (2) the value of a
retirement annuity contract purchased by a § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) or (vi) charitable or-
ganization or religious organization exempt from tax under § 501(a) for its employees
(I.R.C. § 2039(c)(3) (1984)), and (3) the value of an annuity or other payment re-
ceived under chapter 73 of Title 10 of the United States Code (relating to armed ser-
vices personnel) (I.R.C. § 2039(c)(4) (1984)). If an employer who provided any of the
foregoing types of benefits also provided pure death benefits to an employee's survivors,
the question of aggregation could have arisen. Since Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2)
example 6, excepted from the aggregation rule only qualified plans (example 6 specifi-
cally refers to § 401(a) and does not refer to § 403(a) plans or to plans provided by
particular types of employers) the regulation would not have prevented the aggregation
of benefits excluded from the decedent's gross estate by § 2039(c) with other death
benefits. By amending the existing regulations and rulings, the Treasury and the Ser-
vice would resolve any questions about the propriety of aggregating pure death benefits
with benefits provided under these other, quasi-qualified, plans.
216. I.R.C. § 404(a)(2) (1986).
217. Id.
218. I.R.C. § 403(b) (1986). Section 403(b) plans are subject to the limitations
on benefits and contributions of § 415. I.R.C. § 415(a)(2)(B) (1986).
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401(a) plans with respect to benefit distributions. 19 Payments made under
such plans would also fail the second prong of the test. Therefore, they would
not be subject to aggregation even though such payments could have been
included in the gross estate before the repeal of section 2039(c). 22 0
The result of applying the proposed test to other types of employee bene-
fits is less clear. Perhaps courts will find that amounts due under simplified
employee pension plans satisfy the second prong of the proposed test because
distribution of those amounts is subject to the distribution requirements of sec-
tion 401(a)(9), which also apply to qualified plans. 21 In addition, payments
under such plans probably satisfy the second prong of the test because they
are either subject to the joint and survivor annuity provisions of section 417 or
will provide for payment of a lump sum to the participant's surviving
spouse.1
22
Courts might also debate whether amounts due under incentive stock op-
tion plans223 would fulfill either prong of the proposed test. While an examina-
tion of the desirable answers to these questions is beyond the scope of this
Article, the test which the Article has endeavored to develop should assist both
the Service and the courts in conducting such an examination. It will enable
219. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(ll)(B)(iii), 415(k)(1)(C) (1986). To the extent that a
§ 403(b) plan is not subject to the joint and survivor annuity provisions of § 417, it
must provide for a lump sum payment to the participant's surviving spouse. I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(11)(B)(iii) (1986). Neither of these alternatives presents an opportunity for
annuity splitting. See supra note 84.
220. For example, benefits provided by § 403(b) annuity plans were excluded
from the gross estate under § 2039(c) when the decedent's employer was a charitable
organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) or (vi). Because not all organizations
which can adopt § 403(b) plans are described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) or (vi), however,
benefits provided by some § 403(b) annuity plans were included in the gross estate.
221. I.R.C. § 408(c), (a)(6) (1986). Simplified employee pension plans which are
described in § 408(c), are essentially employer-sponsored individual retirement
accounts.
222. I.R.C. 9§ 401(a)(11)(B)(iii), 415(k)(1)(F) (1986). Neither of those alter-
natives presents an opportunity for annuity splitting and avoidance of § 2039. See
supra note 219.
223. Incentive stock option [hereinafter "ISO"] plans are governed by § 422A.
Because an employee can exercise the ISO during his or her life (I.R.C. § 422A(b)(5)
(1986)) and because once the employee exercises the ISO he or she will be entitled to
dividends on the option stock and any appreciation upon sale, the Service might take
the position that the grant of an ISO, if not mere participation in the ISO plan, will
satisfy the lifetime payment requirement. The Service might then aggregate the ISO
plan with other plans in which the employee participates. Section 422A provides de-
tailed requirements for ISO plans and prohibits transfers of the option except by will or
the laws of descent and distribution. I.R.C. § 422A(b)(5) (1986). It does not prohibit
sale of the option stock, nor does it restrict the use to which the optionee may put the
proceeds of any such sale. I.R.C. § 422A (1986). A disqualifying disposition of the
shares prior to the expiration of two years from the date the ISO was granted or one
year from the date the ISO stock was transferred to the employee (I.R.C. §
422A(a)(1) (1986)) will only cause the employee to recognize ordinary income to the
extent of gain realized. I.R.C. § 421(b) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(b)(1) (1986).
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them to distinguish between the question of fulfillment of the lifetime payment
requirement and the question of aggregation. It will allow them to apply a
clearly articulated test to both.2 24
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 2039 was enacted to include in a decedent's gross estate the value
of benefits paid to a survivor under a joint and survivor annuity.2 25 The aggre-
gation rule responded to the Treasury's fear that clever taxpayers and their
employers would avoid the reach of section 2039 by splitting a joint and survi-
vor annuity into two single life annuities, both of which would fail to meet the
requirements of the section. 26 When they excluded qualified plans from the
aggregation rule, the Treasury and the Service appeared to follow the rather
attractive rationale that a benefit not subject to federal estate taxation should
not be used to make another benefit subject to such taxation.
The repeal of the qualified plan exclusion destroys the applicability of
that rationale and requires a re-examination of the aggregation rule. This re-
examination reveals that much of the confusion resulted from an unwillingness
to distinguish between fulfillment of the lifetime payment requirement of sec-
tion 2039 and the issue of aggregation.
The re-examination of this area of the law yields a different analytical
approach to both the aggregation rule and the lifetime payment requirement.
The new approach reconciles the congressional purpose in enacting section
2039 with the Service's current administration of the aggregation rule. It re-
sults in continuing to exclude qualified plans from aggregation. Because it is
fully articulated, it also provides a framework for determining whether other
types of benefits should be subject to aggregation. It thus brings order to a
224. Although the benefits that would not be subject to aggregation under the
proposed test are, in some cases, payable by the same type of plans whose proceeds
were excluded from the gross estate until 1984, two factors bear comment. First, the
reason for excluding the listed benefits from the aggregation rule is grounded on the
inability to use them to thwart the purpose of § 2039 and not their inclusion or exclu-
sion from the gross estate. Second, not all benefits previously subject to the § 2039(c)
exclusion have been listed. Thus, benefits provided under plans adopted by§ 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) or (vi) organizations ("exempt organization plans") previously cov-
ered by the § 2039(c) exclusion are not part of the list.
As previously explained, the reason such benefits were subject to the § 2039(c)
exclusion was that Congress reasoned that since such plans were subject to the same
non-discrimination requirements applicable to qualified plans they should also enjoy the
estate tax benefit of qualified plans. However, exempt organization plans are not sub-
ject to all of the restrictions applicable to qualified plans, and, in particular, are not
subject to the restrictions on the form in which benefits can be paid. See I.R.C.§ 415(k)(1)(A) (1986). Theoretically, then, such plans could be structured so as to
avoid the impact of § 2039. Application of the aggregation rule would prevent such
avoidance, and should therefore occur.
225. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 84.
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complicated area of the law and provides a policy-based mechanism for deter-
mining the reach of a rule whose purpose and application are an integral part
of the federal estate tax system.
The Treasury and the Service should act promptly to amend existing reg-
ulations and published rulings to clarify the scope of the aggregation rule and
the lifetime payment requirement and to make it clear that the repeal of the
estate tax exclusion for qualified plans will not result in the estate taxation of
other, previously untaxed, non-qualified death benefits. If the Treasury does
not so act, perhaps Congress should step into the breach. Congress did not
intend that the coalescence between death and taxes be complete. Inadver-
tence should not make it so.
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